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ABSTRACT 
 Since the 1800s, the United States has sought to advance its interests in what 
currently exists as the Lebanese Republic.  This assessment will look at the shape that 
policy has taken since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in the context of historical relations.  
After doing so, three questions will be addressed: What have been the policies of Iran and 
Syria toward Lebanon during this time period, how effective has U.S. policy been since 
2006 in undermining Iranian and Syrian influence and what policies should the United 
States adopt to offset future destabilizing influence from these countries.  It is concluded 
that the current policy suffers from substantial contradictions and shortcomings in 
addressing the Syrian and Iranian threats, particularly regarding Hezbollah.  A new policy 
in the form of enhanced military and developmental support is advocated, as are steps to 
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―Aeschylus wrote: In sleep, pain that cannot forget falls drop by drop upon the 
heart and in our despair, against our will comes wisdom through the awful grace of God.  
What we need […] is not division, what we need […] is not hatred, what we need […] is 
not violence or lawlessness, but love and wisdom and compassion toward one another, 
and a feeling of justice toward those who still suffer […].  Let us dedicate ourselves to 
what the Greeks wrote so many years ago: to tame the savageness of man and make 
gentle the life of this world.‖ 
-Robert Kennedy – Indianapolis, 1968 
iv 
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Chapter One – Overview of the Analysis 
 
Introduction  
 Since the 1800s, the United States has been involved in the affairs of what is now 
the Lebanese Republic, and has played an important role in influencing developments in 
the area.  During the 19
th
 century, missionaries contributed to the health and education 
sectors and promoted Christianity by printing the bible in Arabic.
1
  These efforts were 
intended to attract Ottomans to Christianity by familiarizing the Christians of the region 
with the values of Protestants in the United States through promoting modernity, 
education and commercial connections.  The missionary experience can be understood as 
an early Wilsonian endeavor of bringing Christians together, while also bringing non-
Christians into the mix as they admired the success of the Christians.
2
 
  Americans made a significant contribution to the future Lebanese Republic by 
launching the Syrian Protestant College in 1866, which would provide educational 
opportunities, ―[…] for all conditions and classes of men without regard to color, 
nationality, race or religion.‖
3
  This institution eventually became the American
                                                             
1 Presbyterian Church USA - General Assembly Mission Council, Lebanon, 
http://gamc.pcusa.org/ministries/global/lebanon/ (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
2 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 158-162.  Discussed in Mead‘s chapter on Wilsonianism. 
 
3 American University of Beirut, History, http://www.aub.edu.lb/main/about/Pages/history.aspx (accessed 
April 6, 2011). 
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University of Beirut, a university that has trained students in such useful fields as 
medicine, nursing, dentistry, engineering, agriculture and business.
4
   
By the mid 20
th
 century, the relationship between the United States and Lebanon 
evolved from one characterized by religious-led development support to that of a 
superpower seeking to advance its strategic interests of containing communism during 
the Cold War.  The methods of U.S. involvement may have changed with the centuries, 
but the Wilsonian concept of actively promoting American interests in the country did 
not.  Lebanon remained strategically important to the United States through the 
containment of communism during the Cold War, and in the post-Cold War efforts to 
secure Israel and contain Iran.   
With U.S.-Lebanon relations now in its third century, the strategic importance of 
Lebanon has become all the more salient as Hezbollah, a group considered by the United 
States to be a terrorist organization,
5
 has gained political and military power in the 
country and threatens both the stability of Lebanon and the security of Israel.  Under both 
the Bush and Obama Administrations, the United States has provided substantial support 
to the Lebanese government,
6
 seeking to bring stability to this often volatile country.  
Moreover, the growing power and influence of Iran in the Middle East
7
 makes its support 
                                                             
4 American University of Beirut n.d. 
 
5 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook [Lebanon], 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html (accessed April 30, 2011). 
 
6 Casey L. Addis, "U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon," Congressional Research Service Report, 
Congressional Research Service (September 1, 2010), 
http://knxasl.hsdl.org/?view&doc=129768&coll=limited  (accessed April 27,), 2-3. 
 




of Hezbollah a serious cause for concern for the United States, given U.S. interests in 
Lebanese stability and the strong Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon through 
Hezbollah.  This thesis seeks to address the following questions: What have been the 
policies of Iran and Syria toward Lebanon during this time period, how effective has U.S. 
policy been since 2006 in undermining Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon and what 
policies should the United States adopt to offset future destabilizing influence from these 
countries. 
 To answer these questions, it is necessary to accomplish two tasks.  First, I will 
provide an overview of the specifics of U.S. policy toward Lebanon in the wake of the 
2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, and will gauge the effectiveness of this policy in advancing 
U.S. geostrategic goals of stabilizing Lebanon, protecting Israel and containing Iranian 
power.  Second, I will specify what future threats will be posed in Lebanon by Iran and 
Syria, and will suggest how U.S. policy can be altered to address these threats while still 
achieving the aforementioned U.S. interests in Lebanon.  
Purpose of the Study 
Initial research on U.S. policy toward Lebanon identified that the foreign policy 
discourse lacks a critical assessment of the policy response to the 2006 war.  There is also 
no thorough assessment of what Iran and Syria‘s threats to U.S. interests in Lebanon will 
be in the coming years, and how the current U.S. policy should be refined to address 
those challenges.  There are many works that offer significant contributions to the history 
of U.S. and Iranian policy toward Lebanon, yet their age precludes them from drawing 
events since the 2006 war into their assessments, let alone many of the major 
developments over the past year.  The discourse also is in need of a contribution that 
4 
 
sheds light on how the United States can both offset Iranian and Syrian influence in 
Lebanon, while at the same time helping develop the Lebanese economy and society.  
A second fact that influenced the decision to conduct this study concerns the high 
stakes for ensuring stability in Lebanon. These stakes are likely to exist into the 
foreseeable future.  It has been reported that Hezbollah has recently increased the number 
of weapons positioned in Lebanon.
8
  Furthermore, it is also believed by the Israeli 
government that Hezbollah may have SCUD missile capabilities as of late.
9
  The 
presence of these weapons increases the likelihood of another military confrontation 
between Israel and Hezbollah, especially if tensions escalate between Israel and Iran over 
the alleged Iranian nuclear program.
10
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 Iran‘s efforts towards Middle East hegemony also underline the need for the 
United States to place policy toward Lebanon under the microscope.  The Iranian 
regime‘s links to Hezbollah and possible nuclear weapons program presents the United 
States with a major threat to its interests and a key opportunity to strike a blow to the 
heart of Iran‘s hegemonic quest.
11
 
 This study is also being pursued in response to the shortcomings that have 
emerged in the post-2006 U.S. policy.  Funding for a military assistance deal negotiated 
                                                             
8 Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Point of No Return," The Atlantic (September 2010), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186/ (accessed April 26, 
2011). 
 
9 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Hizbullah's Alleged SCUDS Raise Storm Clouds Over 
Lebanon," Strategic Comments (June, 2010), 
http://www.iiss.org/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=42222 (accessed April 26, 2011). 
 
10 Goldberg 2010, Goldberg posits that Hezbollah could launch an attack on Israel in response to an Israeli 
attack on Iran‘s nuclear program. 
 




between the United States and Lebanon was suspended for several months in fall 2010.
12
  
Additionally, the ―unprecedentedly warm welcome‖ given to Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad during a recent visit to Lebanon indicates the popularity of the Iranian 
leader amongst citizens and politicians in Lebanon.
13
  Also disconcerting are reports of 
future Iranian assistance programs to Lebanon at a time when Washington‘s commitment 
to Beirut is uncertain.
14
  While the United States has sought to restrict the flow of arms to 
Hezbollah and reinforce the integrity of the Lebanese central government, there have 
been major deficiencies in reaching these ends.  Despite international pressure to disarm, 
Hezbollah now boasts a larger arsenal than they had during the 2006 conflict.
15
  
Moreover, the scope of Hezbollah‘s militia could potentially increase as ties between Iran 
and the Lebanese government become stronger. 
 A final reason for this study is the geostrategic significance of Lebanon to the 
United States.  From the Eisenhower Administration, through the deployment of U.S. 
troops in Lebanon by the Reagan Administration
16
 to the commitments of the George W. 
                                                             
12 Jay Solomon and Adam Entous, "U.S. Lawmakers Drop Hold on Aid to Lebanese Military," The Wall 
Street Journal (November 13, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704865704575610993378651882.html (accessed April 
27, 2011). 
 
13 Fars News Agency, "Ahmadinejad Felicitates Lebanon on National Day," Fars News Agency (November 
21, 2010), http://english.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8908301417 (accessed April 27, 2011). 
 
14 Dominic Evans, "Ahmadinejad Trip Highlights Iranian Sway in Lebanon," Reuters Africa (October 11, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/11/us-lebanon-iran-idUSTRE69A1KC20101011 (accessed 
April 26, 2011). 
 
15 Goldberg 2010. 
 
16 Kail C. Ellis, "U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon," In Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-
First Century, edited by Kail C. Ellis, 91-114 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002),  Discusses 
President Eisenhower‘s conviction that Lebanese, ―‘independence and integrity […are…] vital to the [U.S.] 
national interest and world peace.‘‖ (p. 91-92)  Also acknowledges U.S. military involvement in Lebanon 
during the civil war, and the presence of U.S. troops in the country. (p. 94-97). 
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Bush and Obama Administrations,
17
 Lebanese stability has played a vital role in 
advancing the strategic interests of the United States in the Middle East.  Given 
Lebanon‘s importance to the United States, policymakers and scholars must constantly 
reassess U.S. policy toward this strategic asset and evaluate whether or not a given policy 
is achieving its objectives. 
It is hoped that this project will make a contribution to the discourse on U.S. 
foreign policy toward the Middle East, and will prompt debate as to how best the United 
States can continue to advance its interests.  It will shed light on how Lebanon policy is 
made at the nexus of complex issues such as nuclear proliferation, Israeli security and the 
economic development of a conflict-prone country. The analysis presented will clarify 
how each of these must be taken into account in crafting policy and in evaluating a 
policy‘s efficacy.  As for the Iranian threat, this thesis will expose how Iran‘s danger is 
not limited to the threat posed by a hypothetical nuclear arsenal, but is more realistically 
posed by the complex network of proxies that the Iranian regime has fostered the growth 
of throughout the region.
18
 
Work Plan and Methodology 
This thesis will explore the impact of Iranian, Syrian and U.S. foreign policies as 
factors impacting the promotion of U.S. interests in Lebanon.  The role of the U.S. in 
Lebanon will be discussed in detail in the next chapter as the history of U.S. policy from 
the middle of the 20
th
 century to the present is detailed.  The many facets of the Iranian 
                                                             
17 Addis September 1, 2010, 2-3.  
 
18 Baer 2008, In his fifth chapter, entitled ―Lethal and Elusive: Why Iran‘s Weapons and Tactics Make it 
Unconquerable – Even Without Nukes,‖ Baer sheds light on the importance of unconventional tools of 
warfare at Iran‘s disposal relative to that of nuclear weapons. 
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and Syrian policies will be discussed in Chapter Three, with the analysis of U.S. policy 
offered in Chapter Four.  Chapter Five will outline the policy recommendations based on 
the findings of the analysis, with concluding remarks offered in Chapter Six. 
Research for this thesis was conducted at both the qualitative and quantitative 
levels.  Qualitative research consisted of an evaluation of primary and secondary sources 
relating to what U.S. policy goals have been in Lebanon since 2006, how the United 
States has succeeded or fallen short of its objectives, what the Syrian and Iranian policies 
have been toward Lebanon, what the new challenges are and how the policy should 
change to address those challenges.  The published sources range from government 
documents, journal articles, scholarly books and Congressional committee hearings.  
Specific examples include reports from prominent think tanks such as the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies and an assortment of books by prominent observers of U.S. 
policy and Lebanese affairs. 
Kail C. Ellis provides a detailed account of the Lebanese civil war that lasted 
from the mid 1970s through the 1980s.  He specifically sheds light on the numerous 
changes in U.S. policy that took place over that period of time.  These shifts include 
going from allowing the passage of the U.N. Security Council‘s (UNSC) resolution 
summoning the end of Israeli aggression against Lebanon in the 1970s, to the subsequent 
endorsement of the 1982 Israeli invasion to later concerns for regional peace and the 
subsequent retreat of the United States from Lebanon in the mid-1980s.  Ellis‘ historical 
overview and analysis will be of use in summarizing the history of U.S. policy in 
Lebanon, particularly the inconsistencies in policy that existed during the civil war as a 
result of changing perceptions in the U.S. government of what the most important U.S. 
8 
 
interests were.   Despite the depth of his analysis, its publication in the early 2000s limits 




H.E. Chehabi provides valuable insight into the relationship between Iran and 
Lebanon.  While his assessment goes back over 500 years of regional history, his 
detailing of Iran‘s impact on civil war-era culture and militancy in Lebanon‘s Shi‘ite 
communities is of interest, and is useful in highlighting the development of the resistance 
movement during the civil war.  The depth of Chehabi‘s analysis into the Hezbollah-Iran 
relationship through the 1980s and into the 1990s is helpful in providing historical 
overview, but again, the publication of the book in 2006 limits the scope of the study.
20
 
The intelligence expert Robert Baer addresses the hegemonic aspiration of Iran, 
and how Iran‘s policy in Lebanon, specifically with regards to Hezbollah, fits into a 
broad framework of how the Iranian regime seeks to influence developments throughout 
the Middle East.  While focusing on the Iran-Hezbollah connection, Baer spends less 
time helping the reader understand the need for an organization such as Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.  The book‘s publication in 2008 also means that significant developments over 
the past several years are absent from the analysis.  These developments will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter Three.
21
 
To complement the published sources, an interview was conducted with former 
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill.  The purpose of this interview was to gain 
                                                             
19 Ellis 2002. 
 
20 H.E. Chehabi, ed., Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (New York: Centre for 
Lebanese Studies in Association with I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2006). 
 
21 Baer 2008. 
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insight into the decision-making process in the U.S. government during the 2006 war, as 
well as perspective on how the United States can strengthen its relationship with 
Lebanon. 
Quantitative research focused on data from the U.S. Department of State, with 
specific attention to economic and military assistance figures for Lebanon.  Additionally, 
the online data resources of the World Bank and the Central Intelligence Agency have 
been utilized in compiling and analyzing economic data on Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan 
and Turkey.  This data is presented in the sections that address how economic 
development has been used in the past and can be used in the future as a tool of U.S. 
policy to promote stability.  
The assessment of U.S. policy since 2006 is an analysis based on the theoretical 
contributions of Northedge and Chittick.  Rather than focusing on the creation of policy 
and how the policy emerged from the bureaucratic process, this analysis will study what 
William Chittick calls ―foreign policy outputs [emphasis in original].‖
22
  By first 
delineating the interests and goals of the United States in Lebanon, I will then determine 
whether or not those interests and goals have been advanced based on the policies of the 
past five years.  Chittick discusses the concept of foreign policy outputs analysis, in 
which he considers outputs to be ―[…] the concrete actions, or inactions, of states in 
relation to their environments.‖
23
  He discusses such concepts as ―inputs‖ and ―processes 
                                                             
22 Williom O. Chittick, "The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy," In The Analysis of Foreign Policy 
Outputs, edited by William O. Chittick, 1-29 (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 
1975), 12. 
 
23 Chittick 1975, 12 
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[italics in original]‖ that play a role in the crafting of policy,
24
 but again, the concern of 
this assessment is strictly on assessing the stated interests of the United States vis-à-vis 
the results of the policy. 
An analysis of outputs, according to Chittick, requires the analyst to select one of 
several ―Typologies of Foreign Policy Outputs [italics in original].‖
25
  For the purpose of 
this assessment, Chittick‘s second typology will be used, which focuses on ―functional 
types [of policy], such as political, economic, and military.‖
26
  The policy 
recommendations made in Chapter Five will be made within the framework of these three 
areas, and the assessment made in Chapter Four will break down the policy assessment 
into similar policy areas.      
Another valuable framework for policy analysis has been put forward by F.S. 
Northedge, who posits that: 
 […] ‗success‘ in foreign policy may be broadly defined as the achievement of 
declared, publicized or recognized objects of state policy, the maintenance or 
advancement of prestige or influence abroad, and the abandonment of interests 
only in return for the gaining of comparable or if possible weightier interests.
27
   
 
Northedge also stresses the importance of whether a policy is ―timely‖
28
 and also whether 
it is ―internally consistent or self-contradictory.‖
29
  These concepts of the advancement of 
interests and consistency will be discussed in great detail in Chapter Four. 
                                                             
24 Chittick 1975, 20. 
 
25 Chittick 1975, 14. 
 
26 Chittick 1975, 15. 
 
27 F.S. Northedge, "The Nature of Foreign Policy," In The Foreign Policies of the Powers, edited by F.S. 
Northedge, 9-39 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 35. 
 





 The second chapter is entitled ―American Policy in Lebanon: 1958-2011,‖ and is 
divided into five sections.  This chapter explores the history of U.S.-Lebanon relations 
since the Eisenhower Administration, which was a critical point in defining the emerging 
relationship.  It also sheds light on the 2006 war and the response it prompted from the 
United States, followed by a detailing of the new strategic environment that emerged 
after the war.  Last, the post-2006 war policy response of the United States is explained. 
 The third chapter, ―Threats From Iran and Syria,‖ ascertains current threats posed 
by the influence of Iranian and Syrian policies in Lebanon.  It outlines the circumstances 
that led to the emergence of Hezbollah, and the support that Iran and Syria has provided 
to that organization.  Trends toward a closer relationship between the governments in 
Tehran and Beirut are also discussed.  Syria‘s role in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, and 
the impact that Iran can have on influencing Syria‘s position on that conflict are also 
highlighted; influence that would undoubtedly have an effect on Lebanon.  Iran‘s 
potential nuclear program and the threats associated with it as relates to Lebanon are 
explored as well.  Such threats involve the possible effects of an American or Israeli 
preemptive strike against Iran‘s nuclear infrastructure, as well as the possible effects of 
an Iranian nuclear arsenal on Hezbollah‘s power and relations with Israel. 
The fourth chapter provides an outputs analysis of U.S. policy in Lebanon from 
2006-2011 using the frameworks posited by Chittick and Northedge.  The policy 
objectives outlined toward the end of Chapter Two are revisited, and the success of the 
United States in advancing those objectives measured.  This chapter also offers a broader 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29 Northedge 1968, 37. 
12 
 
critique of the post-2006 policy in the form of criticism of a realist approach to Lebanon 
and a discussion of the policy‘s contradictions. 
Chapter Five makes normative claims on what shape the new policy toward 
Lebanon should take given the lessons of the previous chapter.  Policy recommendations 
are divided into three broad fields: military relations, political relations and economic 
development relations.  These recommendations take into account the evolving threats 
posed by Iran and Syria in Lebanon as delineated in Chapter Three.   
The military relations section suggests how the United States can use military 
training and material support to Lebanon to continue efforts to strengthen the Lebanese 
central government in relation to Hezbollah.  The political relations section looks closely 
at what can be done at both the bilateral and multilateral levels to engage the Lebanese 
government and neighboring states diplomatically to promote stability.  The economic 
development relations section highlights measures that can be taken to promote stability 
through economic growth in Lebanon.  A premise of this section is that economic well-
being could help foster political stability within the country.
30
  This section also addresses 
                                                             
30 Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (March, 1959): 69-105,  
http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/mcooper/ps744readings/lipset.pdf  (accessed April 27, 2011), 83.  
Lipset discusses economic growth as a means of driving democratization. 
Eva Bellin, "The Political-Economic Conundrum." In Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the 
Middle East, edited by Thomas and Marina Ottaway Carothers, 131-150 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 144.  Bellin discusses how improving the economic 
environment in the Middle East can help curb the proliferation of terrorism and enhance the prospects for 




how economic development in Lebanon can penetrate Shiite communities as well to raise 
the quality of life for those individuals.
31
  
 The final chapter summarizes the findings of this research project in the context 
of the Wilsonian approach to international relations.  It also explores the dangers of 















                                                             
31 Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development, 9th Edition (San Francisco: Pearson, 
2006), 22.  Todaro and Smith point out that one of the ―objectives‖ of economic development is, ―To raise 
levels of living [emphasis in original], including, in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, 
better education, and greater attention to cultural and human values, all of which will serve not only to 
enhance material well-being but also to generate individual and national self-esteem.‖  Given this 
argument, wide-scale economic development as a goal of U.S. policy in Lebanon could be used to help 
improve the quality of life of all demographics. 
14 
 
Chapter Two – American Policy in Lebanon: 1958-2011 
Introduction 
 The second chapter of this research project addresses three questions that must be 
answered before one can explore what future policies can be pursued by the United States 
in Lebanon.  For one, what has the U.S. policy been in Lebanon since it became a 
geostrategic asset in the 1950s generally and since 2006 specifically.  Second, what 
developments led to the breakout of the 2006 war, and what was the strategic 
environment that the war yielded.  Last, how did the United States respond after the war 
within the context of both historical U.S.-Lebanese relations and the new strategic 
environment. 
U.S. Foreign Policy in Lebanon: A Brief Historical Overview 
 In order to understand the policy that has been pursued by the United States in 
Lebanon since 2006, one must have an understanding of how the United States has 
identified its interests in Lebanon and the region in the past.  The reader can also gain a 
better idea of how the 2006 conflict compares to previous periods of violence in Lebanon 
in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s as well as how the U.S. response in 2006 differed relative 
to previous conflicts. 
Early U.S.-Lebanese Relations  
The identification of Lebanon as a strategic asset to the United States originated 
during the 1950s.  In the post-World War II environment, U.S. strategic interests in the 
15 
 
Middle East centered primarily on ensuring the protection of the newly-formed Israeli 
state, protecting the rich oil reserves of the region and preventing Soviet expansion into 
the area.
32
  Lebanon began to factor into the third of these strategic interests, the 
containment of the Soviet Union, under the administration of President Dwight 
Eisenhower.  As the Cold War unfolded, President Eisenhower sought a means through 
which the proliferation of communism could be avoided.  Such measures were seen as 
necessary in the wake of Arab nationalism‘s emergence under the leadership of Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952.  These nationalist sentiments were perceived by 
the United States as being linked to communism.  Thus, the United States responded with 
the Eisenhower Doctrine, which would serve the interest of limiting the expansion of 
communism.  It is under the Eisenhower Doctrine that the United States made its first 
commitment of troops to Lebanon in 1958.
33
 
The 1958 deployment stemmed from the belief that Arab nationalism could 
penetrate Lebanese society.  With concerns over the possible results of the 1957 elections 
in Lebanon, the Central Intelligence Agency provided support to the non-Arab nationalist 
incumbent President Camille Chamoun.  The apparent corruption in this election sparked 
a civil war in which the United States contributed forces.
34
  
Further light can be shed on this intervention by looking at the statements made 
by President Eisenhower at the time of these events.  In a radio statement on July 15, 
1958, the president expressed concern about the coup that had taken place in Iraq the 
                                                             
32 Ellis 2002, 91. 
 
33 Ellis 2002, 91-92. 
 
34 Ellis 2002, 92-93. 
16 
 
previous day, as well as a report of an attempted coup in Jordan.  Within this context, 
Lebanon was ensconced in a conflict, which according to the president, was ―[…] 
actively fomented by Soviet and Cairo broadcasts and abetted and aided by substantial 
amounts of arms, money, and personnel infiltrated into Lebanon across the Syrian 
border.‖
35
   
President Eisenhower perceived these developments, as evidenced in his speech, 
as being the result of efforts by the Soviet Union to penetrate the Middle East.  He 
discusses four factors that appear to have driven his decision to send U.S. forces to 
Lebanon.  The two most salient appear to be to safeguard the ―about 2,500 Americans in 
Lebanon‖ as well as ―[…] to assist the Government of Lebanon to preserve its territorial 
integrity and political independence.‖
36
  Further motivations for involvement included the 
Lebanese President‘s request for the United States to intervene in the conflict to ensure 
Lebanese security, as well as the desire of President Eisenhower to uphold the 
commitment of the United Nations to ensure that the meddlesome actions of some states 
did not impact the sovereignty and security of others.
37
  It is in this context that Lebanon 
began to factor significantly in Washington‘s Cold War decisions, and U.S. forces were 
sent to the country. 
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Relations During the Civil War 
 The civil war that commenced in Lebanon in 1975 took place in the wake of two 
regional developments in the late 1960s that impacted the Lebanese state.  The first 
concerns the 1968 Iraqi revolution which brought Ba‘athist leadership to that country.  
This revolution triggered the flight of Iraqi Shiites to a new home in Lebanon.
38
   
The second development was the international legitimacy given to the 
militarization of Palestinians within Lebanon under the Cairo Agreement of 1969.  As a 
result, Palestinian refugees were provided with a Lebanese staging ground for assaulting 
Israel.
39
  Many Palestinians had migrated from Jordan to Lebanon in the early 1970s after 
they had been thrown out of the former, forming what has been described as a Palestinian 
―‗state within a state‘‖ in Lebanon.
40
  This migration has been called ―[…] a catalyst to 
the increasing domestic stresses that contributed to the explosion,‖ as a conflict between 
Lebanon‘s Maronite Catholics and the Palestinians sparked the civil war.
41
  The 
Palestinian migration to Lebanon is also significant in that the PLOs eradication would 
become a motivation for the Israeli operation in Lebanon in 1982.
42
  Attempts were made 
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in 1977 to remove PLO militants from Lebanon through the Chtaura Peace Accords. 
However, the PLO remained active in violence despite that agreement.
43
 
Another factor contributing to the civil war was the significant socio-political 
conflicts within Lebanon during the mid-1970s.  The distribution of political power had 
become unrepresentative of the Lebanese population as the Shi‘ite Muslim share of the 
population increased.  This was significant due to fact that Lebanon‘s political structure 
was based on a distribution of power that could not be reconciled with the new 
population trends.  This resulted in violence and foreign involvement, particularly from 
Syria and Israel in support of the country‘s Christians.
44
 
U.S. policy toward Lebanon during the civil war changed at several points as the 
prioritization of U.S. interests changed.  For example, the U.S. response to the 1978 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon suggests American disapproval of Israel‘s acts.  UNSC 
Resolution 425, which mandated an Israeli pullout, was allowed to pass
45
 without a U.S. 
veto.  This reflects a tacit U.S. condemnation of the invasion. 
As time passed and the administration in Washington changed, the U.S. policy 
toward the war shifted.  Kail C. Ellis states that, ―Israel invaded Lebanon again on 6 June 
1982, allegedly with the blessing of U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig […].‖
46
  
Secretary Haig‘s supposed support for the Israeli invasion indicates the high premium 
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placed by the Reagan Administration on the U.S. interest in protecting Israel‘s national 
security.  However, later developments in the Reagan Administration under Secretary of 
State George Shultz indicate that the preservation of the Arab-Israeli peace process began 
to take priority as a key interest of the United States in addressing the civil war in 
Lebanon; an interest which was threatened by the Israeli incursion.  As a result, 
diplomatic action taken by the Reagan Administration to ensure that Israel‘s PLO pursuit 
in Lebanon did not result in the fall of Beirut to the Israeli armed forces.  This led to the 
agreement to move the PLO from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, as well as proposed 
Israeli-Lebanese talks for peace.
47
   
Another complicating factor in U.S. policy during the civil war concerned the 
involvement of Iran in the war, and the emergence of the militant group Hezbollah.  In 
1979, Iran had come under the leadership of an Islamic government and was no longer an 
ally of the United States.  The new Islamic Republic of Iran did not remain passive while 
Lebanon was invaded by Israel.  The Bekaa Valley became the grounds for Iranian 
military and cultural influence as the Pasdaran imparted skills to the Shi‘ite resistance, 
and as villages in the Bekaa began to adopt conservative Islamic orientation as a result of 
Iranian influence.  This influence involved the shunning of alcohol, the covering of 
women and the proliferation of Iranian propaganda via radio.
48
   
Meanwhile, the Lebanese National Resistance antagonized foreign forces 
occupying Lebanon, including the United States, which dispatched troops in 1982 to 
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facilitate the PLO‘s departure.  1983 proved to be a particularly devastating year for 
United States armed forces and diplomats as the U.S. Embassy and troop barracks were 
attacked in the spring and autumn of that year, respectively.
49
 
The final change in U.S. policy during the civil war occurred in 1984.  Although 
the United States launched retaliatory strikes following the barracks attack against 
militants and Syria‘s weaponry, the United States gradually realized that U.S. interests in 
the country could not be realized in the context of the civil war.  Kail Ellis states, ―[a]fter 
the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1984, U.S. policy began to focus 
almost entirely on securing the release of American and European hostages […].‖
50
 
Relations After the Civil War 
The post-civil war order in Lebanon was largely influenced by a 1989 agreement 
reached by Lebanese officials in Ta‘if, Saudi Arabia: the Document of National 
Reconciliation.  The agreement, which had the support of the United States, facilitated 
the imposition of substantial Syrian political control over Lebanon.
51
  For example, the 
stipulations of the Ta‘if Accord allowed for the deployment of the Syrian military within 
Lebanon.  The Accord states that, ―[…] the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces 
of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon 
with a set period of no more than 2 years […].‖
52
  Syrian military involvement in 
Lebanon however would not necessarily terminate after those two years.  The Accord 
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stipulates that the Syrian and Lebanese governments could then jointly determine the 
positioning of the Syrian military in the Bekaa Valley.  Furthermore, the Accord 
concludes by stating that neither Syria nor Lebanon could ever be allowed to pose a 
threat to the security of the other.
53
 
 This agreement provided a means by which the United States could legitimize 
Syria‘s role in Lebanon.  Aside from the specific military aspects of the Accord, it called 
for the division of political power in Lebanon among the different religious factions 
within the country.  The President was required to be a Christian, while the Prime 
Minister and Speaker of Parliament must be Sunni and Shi‘ite, respectively.  The 
arrangement between the United States and Syria also ensured that the U.S.-backed 
Lebanese leadership would pursue a pro-Syrian agenda.
54
 
 The developments that followed the end of the civil war and the efforts to build a 
post-war order in Lebanon indicate a perception in the United States that Syrian policy 
would serve as a stabilizing variable in Lebanese affairs.  The U.S. support for the Ta‘if 
Accord shows an American acquiescence to Syrian political hegemony within Lebanon 
in the critically important post-war rebuilding years.  The political and security 
environment in Lebanon was volatile at this time, but U.S. policy focused on allowing 
leaders in Damascus to ensure that Lebanon remained stable while it returned to its feet 
after a decade and a half of violence. 
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 In the seventeen years that followed the civil war, developments in Lebanon were 
highly influenced by two countries: Israel and Syria.  Significant Syrian interference, 
including a troop presence, persisted in Lebanon until a popular uprising against Syrian 
policy in 2005.  Syrian meddling during this time ranged from its military presence, to 
determining national leaders and crafting policy.
55
  Israeli involvement took the form of 
military operations.  Israeli military strikes were launched four times in Lebanon between 
the end of the civil war and the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.  These strikes took place in 




 With regards to the 1993 Israeli military operation, dubbed Operation 
Accountability, the United States was reluctant to take the steps necessary to prevent 
aggression.  Kail Ellis states that, ―[t]he United States deplored the violence but indicated 
that it would not intervene in the case of another firestorm.‖
57
  This inaction set a 
precedent that the United States would not directly intervene to prevent the outbreak of 
violence in southern Lebanon. 
 The end of the Cold War had two key impacts on U.S. policy toward the Middle 
East.  First, the United States was no longer in a position where it needed to contain the 
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Soviet Union from expanding into the region.  Second, the roles played by Syria and 
Israel were perceived by the United States as having advanced U.S. interests in Lebanon.  
The disinclination of the United States to put an end to repeated Israeli military 
operations in southern Lebanon is a clear example of this.  It was believed by United 
States that the Ta‘if Agreement would serve the dual interests of protecting the Israeli 
state as well as stabilizing Lebanon. 
The 2006 War: An Overview of the Conflict and the U.S. Response 
The Sources of Conflict 
 Syria‘s political hegemony in Lebanon came to an end in 2005 in the wake of a 
series of significant events.  In 2004, the UNSC passed Resolution 1559, which mandated 
that Syria‘s military be removed from Lebanon.  While the United States had looked 
favorably upon Syria‘s role in Lebanon in the 1990s, the 2000s saw less favorable 
relations between Washington and Damascus.  For one, the Syrian government was 
opposed to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States.  Moreover, it was believed by 
the United States that Syria had become a safe-haven for ―[…] high-level Iraqi Baathists-
-perhaps even Saddam Hussein‘s sons […].‖
58
  There was also a belief that Syria was, 




Within Lebanon itself, political leaders from the Sunni, Druze and Christian sects 
came together in what Paul Salem describes as, ―[…] an anti-Syrian, pro-Western 
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  In February 2005, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a prominent member 
of this nationalist movement, was assassinated in Beirut.  His death prompted the 
formation of the March 14 coalition, a popular movement in Lebanon which caused a 
Syrian withdrawal in just a few short months.
61
 
 These developments affected Hezbollah and their power in Lebanon.  The 2000 
removal of the Israeli military from did not represent a complete termination of Israeli 
infringement upon Lebanese sovereignty.  Israel continues to occupy the Shebaa Farms 
area, and Hezbollah has used this to legitimize themselves since the broader Israeli 
removal in 2000.  This area of land is considered by the Lebanese to be part of Lebanon, 
but is currently under occupation by Israel as part of the Golan Heights.
62
  Moreover, as 
Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs became mired in controversy by the mid-2000s, 
Iran began to displace Syria in assisting Hezbollah in the context of this political 
environment.
 63
  During the summer of 2006, Hezbollah took Israeli troops hostage; an 
act which prompted Israeli airstrikes upon Lebanon
64
 and an Israeli invasion.
65
  What 
ensued during the course of the Israeli operation that summer had tremendous effects on 
the country‘s infrastructure: roads were hit,
66
 as were parts of Beirut‘s international 
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  Economic assets such as power facilities, industrial locations
68
 and agricultural 
areas were also hit.
69
 
The American Response 
 The reaction of the United States to the Israeli aggression reflected the perception 
by the U.S. leadership that Israel‘s use of force against Hezbollah served U.S. interests.  
Several aspects of the U.S. reaction to the war prove this point.  First, the United States 
provided generous support to the Israeli armed forces during the course of the conflict.  
Specifically, support was provided in the form of $300 million worth of aviation fuel
70
 as 
well as the transfer of ―precision-guided munitions.‖
71
   
Second, despite pleas by the Lebanese government for a ceasefire, the United 
States refused to allow a ceasefire resolution to pass the UNSC until well into the 
conflict.
72
  Some light has been shed on the rationale for this delay by Ambassador 
Christopher Hill.  Ambassador Hill was overseas with Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice as events in Lebanon developed in 2006, giving him unique insight to the U.S. 
response to the conflict.  In an interview conducted by the author, the ambassador stated 
that while Israel‘s invasion was never a goal of the United States, Washington did not see 
it in its interests once the invasion had taken place to call for an immediate ceasefire.  It 
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was perceived that a ceasefire ―[…] was not going to lead to an improvement in the 
conditions that led Israel to attack in the first place.‖
73
  Furthermore, the United States did 
little if not nothing to criticize Israel for aggravating the volatile political environment in 
Lebanon.  In fact, Israel was rewarded by the United States for the operation through a 
drastic increase in the U.S. defense assistance package.  Cathy Sultan states that in 2007, 
―[the] U.S. pledges Israel an additional $30.4 billion in military aid over the next ten 
years [ten years presumably from 2007].  This was in addition to the $3.4 billion it 
already received in military aid annually.‖
74
  
The aforementioned post-World War II strategic interests of ensuring both the 
security of Israel and the flow of oil from the Arab World are interests that have 
transcended time and that continue to be pertinent today.  While the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union has dissipated in the wake of the union‘s collapse, today the United States 
seeks to prevent the regional hegemony of another state: Iran.  Although Iran was an ally 
of the United States under the reign of the Shah, the country has grown antagonistic of 
the United States and its regional policy in the wake of the 1979 revolution.  The 
destabilizing efforts by Iran committed in Lebanon through support for the Shia 
resistance are delineated above.  A more substantial analysis of Iran‘s effects on 
Lebanese stability is discussed in Chapter Three.  It is important to note however that a 
key strategic interest of the United States in the Middle East which has assumed great 
significance in the post-Cold War era is that of containing Iran.
75
  Their drive for 
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influence in the region has led to, ―U.S., Israeli and Saudi Arabian competition with Iran 
– and to a lesser extent Syria – over the shaping of the Middle East‘s security order in the 
wake of Iraq in 2003.‖
76
 
The Post-War Strategic Environment for the United States 
 The 2006 conflict and its aftermath reinforced an already dangerous strategic 
environment for the United States that had been in place since the civil war.  Hezbollah‘s 
performance during the war and Israel‘s eventual disengagement from Lebanon without 
disarming Hezbollah have triggered serious repercussions that have been felt throughout 
the Middle East.  These repercussions threaten the stability of Lebanon, the security of 
Israel and the interest of containing Iranian regional power. 
Israel’s Departure from Lebanon 
 Perhaps the most immediate consequence of the 2006 war as pertains to U.S. 
interests were the mission shortcomings on the part of the Israeli government.  On July 
17, 2006, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert spoke before the Israeli Knesset, laying out the 
Israeli rationale for going to war in Lebanon.  Speaking with regards to terrorist 
organizations, the prime minister stated:  
It is a regional – as well as global – interest to take control and terminate their 
[terrorist organizations‘] activity. […] We can all see how the majority of the 
international community supports our battle against the terror organizations and 
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our efforts to remove this threat from the Middle East.  […] We intend to do this.  
We will continue to operate in full force until we achieve this.
77
 
Prime Minister Olmert elaborated on his government‘s motives, stating what goals both 
the international community and Israel were in concord on achieving:  
The return of the hostages, Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev; […] A 
complete ceasefire; […] Deployment of the Lebanese Army in all of Southern 





History would show that despite these ambitious goals, the Israeli government 
experienced significant mission shortcomings in the 2006 conflict.   
By the end of the war, Israel was unable to secure the release of the hostages it 
had sought to free earlier that July.  In fact, the two Israeli hostages did not survive, and it 
was not until two years after the conflict that their bodies were repatriated in a deal which 
cost Israel five Lebanese captives.
79
  Furthermore, its goals of eliminating Hezbollah 
never came to fruition.  Thus, Israel failed to achieve two of its key objectives.   
This was not the first instance that the Israeli government had fallen short of its 
military objectives in Lebanon.  Despite several military campaigns in Lebanon since the 
late 1970s with the intent of improving its security, Hezbollah still exists.  Once again, 
following the 2006 conflict, Israel found itself with an extremist group just north of its 
borders, wielding substantial power.  As stated by Paul Salem: 
                                                             
77 Prime Minister's Office, Address by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert - The Knesset (July 17, 2006), 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2006/07/speechknesset170706.htm (accessed January 
20, 2011), Translation.  Ellipses represent line breaks in original. 
 
78 Prime Minister's Office 2006.  Translation.  Ellipses represent line breaks in original. 
 
79 CNN, "Israel Buries Remains of Returned Soldiers," CNN.com (July 17, 2008), 




Israel, despite unleashing massive airpower on Hezbollah strongholds, failed to 
knock out the organization or even to stop its missile attacks, while the setbacks 
suffered by Israel‘s ground invasion had the effect of puncturing the aura of 
invincibility long projected by the Israel Defense Forces.
80
 
If the United States considers Israeli security to be a strategic interest in the Middle East, 
then one must question the efficacy of repeated Israeli military operations in southern 
Lebanon in advancing that interest.  Not only has the Hezbollah threat persisted in the 
wake of the previous military confrontations and the 2006 conflict, but it has also gained 
a heightened level of political legitimacy both in Lebanon and throughout the region in 
the wake of the conflict. 
The Empowerment of Hezbollah  
Robert Baer details how Hezbollah‘s political clout increased after 2006.  He 
describes the popularity of Hezbollah‘s Hassan Nasrallah in North Africa and the Levant 
from Egypt to the West Bank and back to Lebanon.  The reason, Baer argues, for this 
iconic image of Nasrallah is the achievement in 2006.  As Baer states, ―[…] Nasrallah 
beat the Israelis on the field of battle, David slaying the Israeli Goliath.‖
81
 
 Hezbollah‘s public relations victory in Lebanon was also impacted by how the 
organization engaged the Shia following the 2006 war.  Much of the south of Beirut and 
areas further south in Lebanon were badly damaged by the Israeli strikes, but Hezbollah 
offered to cover the costs for rebuilding war-destroyed houses, as well as providing some 
$12,000 cash per household.  Moreover, the community reconstruction efforts made by 
Hezbollah are suggested to have been more substantial and aggressive than the efforts 
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undertaken by the Lebanese government itself.  As Robert Fisk states, ―[i]ts 
[Hezbollah‘s] massive new reconstruction effort – free of charge to all those Lebanese 
whose homes were destroyed or damaged – […] has won the loyalty of even the most 
disaffected members of the Shia community in Lebanon.‖
82
   
Despite the fact that Hezbollah was much to blame for the outbreak of the war 
with Israel, these efforts had a significant strategic implication for the United States.  It 
shed light on the inability of the Lebanese government to respond to the perceived needs 
of the south of the country in both the security and economic sectors, whereas Hezbollah 
was able not only to defend the area against Israel, but to start to rebuild it after the 
conflict.  Thus, Hezbollah, with its likely Iranian financing,
83
 was displacing the central 
government, and enhancing its own public image. 
A Victory for Iranian Hegemony 
A final characteristic of the strategic environment that emerged after the 2006 war 
regards the impact the war had on Iran‘s ability to seek regional hegemony in the Middle 
East.  In his work The Devil We Know, Robert Baer outlines the hegemonic ambitions of 
the Iranian regime, and the centrality of Lebanon to that endeavor.  Baer‘s theory is that 
Iran will build a network of organizations such as Hezbollah in seeking to advance 
Iranian interests.  These hegemonic aspirations on the part of Iran, and Lebanon‘s 
specific role in those plans, will be discussed in great length in the next chapter.  It is 
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worth noting at this point however that Iran views its relationship with Hezbollah as the 
first step in building that network of relationships.
84
  As Baer states:  
[t]he Lebanon war is Iran‘s blueprint for its new empire, fought for and held by 
proxies: the first Middle Eastern empire since the Ottomans, a superpower, as the 
Iranians intend to demonstrate to the world.
85
   
The Iranians realized successes with the Israeli pull-out from Lebanon in 2000, but also 
more recently in Hezbollah‘s military victory in 2006.
86
  These successes clearly impact 
the strategic environment for the United States in that Iran now has a tested means 
through which to influence affairs in its client states despite tremendous pressure from 
both the United States and Israel.  As the next chapter will discuss, the stakes for Iran 
implementing this hegemonic network extend far beyond Lebanon, and can have 
implications on critical U.S. interests elsewhere in the region.   
In summation, the post-2006 strategic environment for the United States can be 
categorized by the strategic weakening of Israel due to this last in a string of military 
failures in Lebanon.  Furthermore, there was a weakening of the Lebanese central 
government relative to Hezbollah and the strengthening of the Iranian regime and its 
Lebanese proxy. 
What Policies Were Pursued? 
   With a better understanding of the strategic environment that emerged in the 
months following Israel‘s pull-out from Lebanon in 2006, one can begin to understand 
what the specific interests of the United States were and what policies the U.S. 
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government pursued to advance these interests.  The specifics of these interests and 
policies can be found in the statements made by senior State Department officials in their 
testimony before Congressional committees.  Specifically, we turn to the testimonies of 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs C. David Welch in November 2007 
as well as the testimony of Mr. Welch‘s successor, Jeffrey Feltman, in July 2008.  Both 
of these men were speaking before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia 
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
 Four themes become apparent in looking at their statements, as well as other 
accounts of the post-2006 era.  First, they emphasize the promotion of democracy in 
Lebanon.  Second, they mention reinforcing Lebanese sovereignty by building a strong 
Lebanese government and economy to counter Hezbollah while also ensuring the 
protection of Lebanese sovereignty by securing the border with Syria against the 
proliferation of weapons into Lebanon.  Third, they stress seeking justice in the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
87
  A fourth theme that while not 
substantially addressed by Welch or Feltman is significant nonetheless is maintaining the 
commitment to ensure Israeli national security.  The pursuit of these four interests has 
largely framed the U.S. policy toward Lebanon since 2006. 
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The interest of promoting democracy in Lebanon stems from the threat posed by 
the new strategic realities of a weakened Lebanese government and the empowered roles 
of Syria and Iran due to Hezbollah‘s victory.  In terms of democratization, the United 
States has called for implementation of the provisions of UNSC Resolutions 1559 and 
1701.  Resolution 1559 specifically offers:  
[…] support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon‘s upcoming 
presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised 
without foreign interference or influence [.]
88
 
   
In his statement, Welch implies that foreign interference from Syria could perhaps be 
curbed if free presidential elections were to take place in Lebanon.
89
  Aside from simply 
stating the importance of promoting democracy through elections and Lebanon‘s 
obligations under Resolution 1559, the Bush Administration also, ―[…] approved a ban 
against travel to the United States of any persons who are responsible for policies and 
actions that threaten Lebanon‘s sovereignty and democracy.‖
90
  Moreover, the Treasury 
Department under the Bush Administration later froze the property of the same types of 
agitators delineated in the travel ban.
91
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One can deduce that these policies were a response to the new strategic 
environment created by Hezbollah‘s infringement upon Lebanon‘s democracy.  A war 
had been launched in 2006 that was not executed by the Lebanese government, but rather 
by a militant organization striving to gain the return of Lebanese held captive in Israel, 
and also to showcase their power.
92
  This clearly undermined the democratic process in 
Lebanon.  Furthermore, Lebanon suffered in the months following the 2006 war from the 
withdrawal of Shia public servants from cabinet positions.  Welch also recalls that in the 
months prior to the war, assassinations hampered the functioning of the Lebanese 
government.
93
  In a zero-sum game between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, 
these measures could be seen as a means of increasing the power of the Lebanese 
government, and thus decreasing the power of Hezbollah. 
Building a Strong Lebanese Central Government and Diminishing the Power of 
Hezbollah 
A second related interest to that of promoting democracy involves building a 
strong Lebanese central government.  Welch cited the, ―[…] significant economic, 
military and diplomatic assistance […]‖ that was offered under the Bush 
Administration.
94
  According to the Department of State‘s FY2011 Budget Justification, 
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) received $186,400,000 from the 
United States in FY2009.  By FY2010, the enacted amount increased to $210,914,000, 
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and the FY2011 amount increased further to $212,000,000.
95
 This is one of the largest 
allocations given to a U.S.-backed international peacekeeping activity.
96
  Economic 
assistance is also evident in a huge surge in U.S. support through the Economic Support 
Fund (ESF).  Recent State Department budget documents indicate that ESF allocations 
for Lebanon have increased from an actual allocation of $34,794,000 in FY2004
97
 to a 
requested $109,000,000 for FY2011.
98
   
Not only have the allocation levels been increasing, but the nature of the support 
has also changed to become more in tune with the strategic objectives of the assistance.  
For example, in the FY2006 Function 150 Report, the ESF allocation for Lebanon was 
intended ―[…] to promote economic growth and trade reform; continue good governance 
programs; protect the environment; and support the four American Educational 
Institutions in Lebanon.‖
99
  By the FY2008 report, the nature of the support had changed 
completely.  Rather than prioritizing economic programs and American institutions, the 
support was geared toward: 
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[…] support[ing] Lebanon‘s democratic traditions by establishing credible, 
transparent governing institutions, fostering human rights, supporting civil society 
organizations, and improving educational and economic opportunities among the 
Lebanese people.  Certain funds will be targeted to securing Lebanon‘s water 
resources, reducing the ability of Hizbollah to make water an issue that divides 




This rhetoric suggests that these funds are intended to advance the aforementioned 
interests of promoting the power of the central government, while at the same time 
diminishing the power of Hezbollah.  Furthermore, the support appears to be geared 
toward reinforcing Lebanese democracy, which would in theory reduce the influence of 
foreign powers such as Syria and Iran.  Also, by improving water access, fostering the 
growth of civil society and advancing the state of education and the economy, the United 
States would be working to confront the very social problems that Hezbollah could 
capitalize on to recruit supporters. 
 Another area of support mentioned by Welch involves military assistance.  One 
channel of support has been Foreign Military Financing (FMF).  The initial allocation for 
FY2006 requested by the Bush Administration was a mere $1,000,000.
101
  In the wake of 
the war however, these allocations saw a surge similar to that seen in the ESF.  By 
FY2008, the FMF request for Lebanon was $220,000,000; support which, according the 
State Department, would be used to help ensure Lebanese compliance with UNSC 
Resolution 1701 through providing the means to fulfill their material and training 
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  Subsequent FMF levels have been well above that of the initial FY2006 
level of $1,000,000.
103




 Other forms of security assistance offered to the Lebanese government have taken 
the form of International Military Education and Training (IMET).  In FY2005, the actual 
amount of funds committed to Lebanon was some $809,000.
105
  Initial FY2006 requests 
were a mere $700,000,
106
 yet by FY2008, $1,477,000 had been spent on Lebanon for 
IMET.
107




 The basis for this substantial material and training support to the Lebanese 
government was justified by the Bush Administration as having been in the interest of 
reinforcing the power of the Lebanese government relative to Hezbollah.  Feltman made 
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this interest clear in his statement before the House subcommittee, in which he cited his 




 The U.S. policy of reinforcing Lebanese sovereignty does not stop with providing 
material and training assistance to the Lebanese government.  In addition to these 
programs, the United States has taken measures to ensure that materials such as weapons 
do not cross Lebanon‘s borders, particularly from Syria.  UNSC Resolution 1701, passed 
after the war, prohibits the transfer of weapons ―[…] to any entity or individual in 
Lebanon […].‖
110
  Welch reiterates the support of the United States toward this end, 
recalling efforts made to garner international support to help guard the Lebanese border 
from weapons smuggling.
111
 Feltman also stressed the importance of border security a 
year later in 2008, stating that the issue of weapons coming across the border still 
persisted and merited action.
112
  In fact, some of the military assistance provided by the 
United States has been destined to promote border security and prevent arms trafficking 
across the border from Syria.  Support has been provided to Lebanon‘s Internal Security 
                                                             
109 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 2008, 10. 
 
110 United Nations Security Council, "S/RES/1701 (2006)," United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(August 11, 2006),  http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement  (accessed April 27, 2011), 4. 
 
111 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 2007, 12. 
 
112 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign 




Forces (ISF) for use in securing the border.  This support has included training, gear, and 
some 360 vehicles as of a 2009 report.
113
 
 Without weapons flowing from Syria into Lebanon, the United States may be able 
to advance its goal of ultimately disarming Hezbollah by preventing weapons from 
reaching the organization.  UNSC Resolution 1701 requires that the government of 
Lebanon be the only armed entity within the republic.
114
  Welch again emphasizes this 
key provision, stating a critical position of the United States.  He points out that while 
Hezbollah‘s participation within Lebanon‘s political system would be viewed as 
acceptable by the United States, its existence as an armed militant organization is 
completely intolerable.
115
   
The significance of this statement will be revisited when policy recommendations 
are discussed in Chapter Four.  At this point though, it is necessary to realize that from 
the policy perspective of the United States, Hezbollah‘s existence as an armed militant 
organization is seen as a major obstacle to Lebanese stability.  This U.S. position has 
been translated into policy through the disarmament provisions of UNSC Resolution 
1701, Feltman‘s strong anti-armed-Hezbollah rhetoric, the assistance to support Lebanese 
border security and the economic and military assistance programs.  This assistance 
would theoretically strengthen the Lebanese military and improve the economic 
conditions in the country, making militancy less appealing to Lebanese citizens. 
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It is important to mention that the decision taken by the international community 
to marginalize Hezbollah‘s power following the summer of 2006 was not the only 
alternative open at the time.  Cathy Sultan states that:  
[i]n the aftermath of the war, a number of possible approaches [for dealing with 
Hezbollah] were proposed, ranging from straight disarmament to the integration 
of Hezbollah forces into the national defense structure as a sort of civil defense 
league or national guard.
116
   
 
As has been made clear by the subsequent U.S. policy position following the war, and by 
the UNSC Resolution passed with American support, a decision was made to choose 
straight disarmament of Hezbollah over other alternatives. 
The United States also took more drastic measures to offset Hezbollah‘s power in 
Lebanon following the war.  Cathy Sultan details a program supported by the Bush 
Administration, Saad Hariri, and the Saudi Arabian Government.  The Bush 
Administration pursued a policy of arranging Saudi support for Fatah al-Islam, an 
extremist group whose leadership had links to al-Qaeda.  It was believed that support for 
this Sunni group could balance out the power of Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon.  This was 
part of a broader strategy to balance Hezbollah‘s power, and by extension Syrian and 
Iranian power, in the country.
117
 
Other more ambitious U.S. policy goals intended to stabilize Lebanon included 
plans to establish a joint U.S. and international military presence within the country.  
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While these plans never materialized, Cathy Sultan describes talks over the possibility of 
creating a U.S./NATO air force base in Lebanon, near the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.
118
 
Another Lebanese sovereignty issue that has been incorporated into U.S. policy 
since 2006 has been the issue of the Shebaa Farms.  This issue is also brought up in the 
post-war UNSC Resolution 1701, in which the UNSC seeks the ―[…] delineation of the 
international borders of Lebanon [names Shebaa Farms][.]‖
119
  Feltman points out how 
the Bush Administration made solving this border problem a priority, believing that 
solving it could help foster more peaceful Lebanese, Syrian and Israeli relations.
120
  
Feltman is not alone in his belief that solving the Shebaa Farms border issue could have a 
significant impact on Lebanese security.  Paul Salem posits that convincing Hezbollah to 
give up their weapons will be more tenable if, among other things, the United Nations 
took authority over the Shebaa Farms.
121
 
Investigating the Assassination of Rafik Hariri 
A third policy issue of importance to the United States has been efforts to bring 
justice to those behind the 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri.  Welch highlights the fact that, in addition to helping garner international 
support for the investigative tribunal, the United States provided some $5,000,000 to help 
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  It is no surprise that the United States would be interested in creating an 
international body that would look into who was behind the assassination.  It is clear that 
the results of the investigation could detract from Hezbollah‘s power.   
David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggests that if 
responsibility is placed on Hezbollah for the attack, it would have a deleterious impact on 
the organization‘s power, even if legal action is not taken against the organization or its 
members.
123
  Presumably, such damage could come in the form of decreased legitimacy 
for Hezbollah, both in Lebanon and internationally.  This result could play to the 
advantage of the Lebanese government in the power struggle between it and Hezbollah. 
Ensuring Israeli National Security 
 As has been stated, one of the strategic implications of the 2006 war was Israel‘s 
withdrawal from Lebanon without having met some of its most important security 
objectives, as well as the political and strategic victories of Hezbollah, Syria and Iran.  At 
the same time that the United States was working to strengthen the Lebanese government, 
it was also taking steps to safeguard Israeli security against Hezbollah.  One aspect of this 
policy was an increase in U.S. military assistance.  A ten-year, $30.4 billion package was 
offered to Israel to complement then yearly levels of over $3 billion.
124
   
                                                             
122 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 2007, 11. 
 
123 Shaun Waterman, "Bad Choice: Stability in Lebanon or Support for Tribunal," The Washington Times 
(January 13, 2011),  http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/13/bad-choice-stability-in-lebanon-
or-support-for-tri/  (accessed April 27, 2011). 
 
124 Sultan 2008, 136. 
43 
 
Several reports also suggest that U.S. interests in Israeli national security may be 
behind the decisions taken by policymakers to avoid providing more substantial military 
support to the Lebanese government.  A report by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies indicates that: 
[t]he U.S. has had reservations about augmenting the LAF‘s [Lebanese Armed 
Forces] capabilities in light of Israeli interests, Hizbullah, Lebanon‘s place in the 
ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict and the overall perceived instability and weakness 
of Lebanon from political and security standpoints.
125
   
 
Moreover, members of the U.S. Congress have shown concern over the past year 
regarding the possible use of force by Lebanon‘s military against Israel.
126
  These fears 
came to fruition in August 2010 when Lebanese forces opened fire on and killed an 




These four goals have set the broad framework for U.S. policy toward Lebanon 
since the 2006 conflict.  With these policies delineated, one can now begin to assess the 
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Chapter Three – Threats From Iran and Syria 
Introduction 
 For much of Lebanese history, the foreign policies of Syria and Iran have weighed 
heavily on political, social and economic developments within Lebanon.  In the case of 
Syria, the relationship between the government in Damascus and Beirut has changed 
from one of a sovereign, to an occupier and then a hegemon.  In the case of Iran, post-
1979 political developments in that country have prompted a close relationship between 
the Shia Islamic Republic, and the Lebanese Shia population, which remains ensconced 
in conflict with the Israeli state.  This chapter will highlight the threats posed to American 
interests in Lebanon by Syria and Iran. 
 Given the conceptualization of this project as delineated in the first chapter, 
Iranian and Syrian foreign policy can be viewed as independent variables impacting 
stability within Lebanon.  By assessing the impact that these variables currently have and 
may have in the future on U.S. interests, we can gain a better perspective on how the 
United States should craft a new policy. 
Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon 
 To adequately grasp the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and how Syria and Iran are 
able to shape developments through this group, it is important to understand the context 
of why the organization‘s appeal has emerged and grown over time, and how Iran and 
45 
 
Syria have been able to capitalize on that appeal.  This appeal can best be understood in 
terms of two areas: community outreach and Lebanese national security.   
The Appeal of Hezbollah: Community Outreach 
In a country where the government is weak, people may turn to within their own 
community in looking for power to be exercised.  This phenomenon, as occurred in 
Lebanon, is discussed by Mehran Kamrava, who states that: 
[i]n Lebanon, to cite an extreme example, the atrophy of the state in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s resulted in a dramatic heightening of such primordial forces as 
sectarianism and clannishness to the extent that the average Lebanese citizen was 
plagued by a ‗confessional mind.‘
128
   
 
In terms of community outreach, Mohamad Bazi of the Council on Foreign Relations 
explains that dating back to the 1960s, the Lebanese government has fallen short of 
meeting the needs of Shia within the country.
129
  Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr highlights 
these governmental shortcomings, stating that: 
 [a]s for public services and institutions, the state provided few schools or 
hospitals in the Shi‘ite areas, while the contents of the history textbooks seemed 
rather alien because they did not even partially represent Shi‘ite aspirations and 
national narratives.
130
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As a response to this need for a Shia educational system, efforts have been made to 
establish Shia schools within these neglected communities, and it is indicated by Shaery-
Eisenlohr that at least some of these schools are ―Hizbullah-run.‖
131
    
Hezbollah in particular has been able to capitalize on the government neglect of 
the Shia population in that, ―[i]t created a dependency and social service network that 
guaranteed its dominance.‖
132
  The concept of Shia organizations in Lebanon predates the 
establishment of Hezbollah.  For example, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a Shiite 
religious leader, worked as a leader and fundraiser for organizations such as the Imam 
Khu‘i Orphanage and Bahman Hospital, both of which eventually came under the 
umbrella of his Benevolent Charity Society.
133
  Specific services offered by Hezbollah 
consist, ―[…] of social services to its constituents that include construction companies, 
schools, hospitals, dispensaries, and micro-finance initiatives […].‖
134
  It is believed that 
as much as an annual $100 million of the financing for these services come from the 
Islamic Republic.
135
   
It is reported that in the wake of the 2006 war, some $1 billion in Iranian capital 
had been invested by Hezbollah in development and reconstruction initiatives.
136
  In the 
realm of national security regarding Israel, and in terms of providing for Shia in Lebanon, 
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Hezbollah has made itself a useful component of Lebanon‘s political, economic and 
security apparatus.  
The Appeal of Hezbollah: Lebanese National Security 
Hezbollah‘s presence in Lebanese politics and society can also be understood in 
terms of addressing Lebanese national security.  The organization‘s very genesis came 
shortly after Israeli troops entered Lebanon in the early 1980s.
137
  As Israeli forces moved 
into Lebanon in 1982 for the second time in four years, several Lebanese entities took up 
arms against the Israeli military, including Hezbollah.  Hezbollah was not only 
responsible for significant attacks against the Israelis such as the 1982 Tyre suicide car-
bombing, but it took ownership in a majority of these strikes against Israeli forces.
138
  
During the Israeli invasion in the 1980s, Lebanon‘s Shia became the backbone of the 
armed opposition.  According to Mohamad Bazi, ―[t]he Shiites turned out to be more 
formidable enemies of Israel than the PLO.‖
139
  Paul Salem suggests that Hezbollah 
perceives itself as an entity that is necessary due to Lebanon‘s military incapacities.  He 
states, ―Hezbollah has pointed to the weaknesses of the Lebanese army and state in the 
past to justify its own existence.‖
140
 
The suspected growth in Hezbollah‘s rocket and missile capabilities as mentioned 
earlier are proof of the premium that Hezbollah puts on its role as a security organization.  
Also worth noting are the steps taken by Hezbollah to focus its militarism in the south on 
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Israel.  While Hezbollah engaged in the targeting of non-Israelis during the 1980s with 
the killing of an American serviceman during the TWA flight 847 hijacking in 1985,
141
 
there is evidence to show that today Hezbollah is principally concerned with focusing its 
security prerogatives on the Israeli occupation.  For one, the organization has accepted 
the part of UNSC Resolution 1701 which stipulates a UNIFIL presence in south Lebanon, 
and has even accepted the fact that its members ―may be detained and disarmed‖ if 
caught with weapons.
142
  Moreover, Hezbollah made clear in August 2006 that its arsenal 
was strictly for the means of confronting Israel and not for internal use within 
Lebanon.
143
  These developments may suggest a more focused security perspective of the 
organization.  However, the group‘s outside links are a cause for concern, and can have a 
major impact on Hezbollah‘s future operations. 
Hezbollah’s International Links 
Hezbollah‘s connections with Iran and Syria can best be understood in terms of 
political/economic and military material connections.  Political connections between Iran 
and Hezbollah can be seen in the highest levels of leadership within the organization.  
Both Ayatollah Ali Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps are believed to have connections to the preeminent decision making 
apparatus within Hezbollah, known as the Majlis al-Shura.
144
  These political connections 
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can be viewed in the framework for Iranian hegemony outlined by Robert Baer.  He notes 
that the successes yielded by Iran‘s support for Hezbollah, namely the 2000 withdrawal 
of Israeli forces out of Lebanon, has proven to the Iranian leadership that developing 
connections to Shia in the Arab World can provide Iran with the means to advance its 
foreign policy goal of regional hegemony.
145
 
 Iran‘s attempts at hegemony in Lebanon have become all the more salient since 
the summer 2010.  As the United States has started to debate the discontinuation of its 
assistance program to Lebanon, Iran is seeking to take advantage of the situation and the 
possible deterioration of U.S. support.  Following a U.S. moratorium on military 
assistance in August 2010, the Iranian government suggested that it would provide 
assistance in light of the U.S. reneging on its commitment to Lebanese security.  Iran was 
also reported in October 2010 to be close to finalizing a loan worth $450 million to 




 Another form of Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon is that of military 
assistance to both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government.  Various reports suggest that 
material assistance to Hezbollah from these countries has been stepped-up in the years 
following the 2006 war.  Hezbollah is reported to hold ―[…] as many as 45,000 rockets – 
at least three times as many as it had in the summer of 2006 […].‖
147
  There are also 
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reports of alleged SCUD missile transfers between Syria and Hezbollah.
148
  A 2010 
report by the United Nations sheds light on these allegations, indicating that while the 
Lebanese government is unaware of any violations of illegal weapons transfers, the 
Israeli government has claimed that Hezbollah controls some ―55,000 missiles and 
rockets.‖
149
  Furthermore, the report states that the Israeli government has indicated to the 
United Nations that it believes that illegal weapons transfers between Syria and Lebanon 
are taking place.  However, the United Nations has been unable to confirm the reports.
150
  
Additional assistance from Iran directly to Hezbollah has come from the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, where they ―[…] serve alongside senior Hizbullah officials, 
as well as give vital technical support.‖
151
 
 One increasingly important aspect of the current discourse on Hezbollah is the 
debate on whether the organization‘s institutional loyalty lies in the Lebanese state or in 
Iran.  Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson take up this question, shedding light on a 
conclusion reached by RAND analysts, which is that trends may show that Hezbollah is 
seeking autonomy from Iran.  Simon and Stevenson suggest that the organization will 
eventually be placed in a position where it must disarm.  They argue that the Lebanese 
people have reacted negatively to past Hezbollah acts to undermine Lebanese 
sovereignty, namely the violence in May 2008 over a standoff between Hezbollah and the 
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Lebanese government and reports of serious financial corruption within the group that 
had a negative impact on their Shia constituents.  The authors posit that in the wake of 
these public relations problems amongst the Lebanese populace, Hezbollah may make a 
move away from militancy.
152
 
Lebanese Nationalism and Hezbollah 
 To better understand the question of Hezbollah‘s autonomy in its relationship 
with Iran and Syria, one must look at trends in Shiite nationalism within Lebanon.  As 
argued by Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, a major part of Lebanese political life is a sense 
of religious nationalism.  She argues:  
[i]n the context of Lebanese political traditions, visions of the Lebanese nation 
have often taken the shape of a nationalism highlighting religious belonging.  In 
fact, belonging to a religious community is the only legitimate way of being part 
of the Lebanese nation.
153
   
  
Each religious sect within Lebanon therefore seeks power vis-à-vis the other sects in 
framing the country‘s society in a non-exclusive manner.
154
 
 From ―the 1960s‖ onward, there has been a Shiite nationalist movement in 
Lebanon that seeks to, ―[…] break with the dominant national narrative of Maronite 
Lebanon, with which most of them [Shia in Lebanon] do not identify […].‖
155
  For 
example, following the civil war, the rebuilding of Beirut at the hands of Rafik Hariri was 
conducted, according to Shaery-Eisenlohr, in the Sunni image of creating a vibrant 
                                                             
152 Simon Summer 2010. 
 
153 Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008, 5. 
 
154 Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008, 9. 
 
155 Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008, 3. 
52 
 
commercial center in the city; an image that the country‘s Shia could not relate to and 
were thus ostracized from.
156
   
In this context, Iran‘s support to Shia is a function of the need to advance 
sectarian nationalist goals.
157
  Historically, there is evidence that nationalism in Lebanon 
has at times trumped Shia ties to Iran.  One case that helps illustrate this point is the issue 
of Iranian education in Lebanon, particularly in terms of the instruction of Farsi.   
In the early 1960s, Farsi lessons received a hostile reception amongst the Shia 
community in Lebanon, because the language was associated with a regime in Tehran 
that stood aligned with Israel and against Pan-Arabism.  Shaery-Eisenlohr mentions how 
students rose up to these efforts to teach Farsi by not attending classes, and even resorting 
to violence against an instructor.  Shaery-Eisenlohr‘s assessment also suggests that as 
recent as the early 2000s, the promotion of the Iranian language is still not embraced even 
within Shia schools.  She mentions specifically schools where pupil‘s families are linked 
to Hezbollah or the resistance in some way.  At these schools, the instruction of Farsi is 
not popular, and the families perceive Farsi to be unimportant relative to, ―[…] English 
and French, which the parents consider highly relevant for their children‘s future.‖
158
  It 
would appear that despite the religious connection to Iran, Arab and Lebanese nationalist 
ties transcend Shia unity.  This suggests that Lebanese Shia autonomy from Iran may not 
be a far-fetched political possibility. 
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Evidence also exists to suggest that Hezbollah has a substantial degree of political 
autonomy from Iran and Syria dating back to the 2006 war.  It is suggested by Cathy 
Sultan that the ultimate decision to execute the kidnapping that prompted the war was 
made by Hezbollah, and that Iran and Syria essentially had to go along for the ride after 
the fact.  She cites sources from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the 
Israeli government to back this claim.
159
  Once the war commenced, it also appears that 
the Hezbollah mission was more grounded in Lebanese rather than Iranian policy.  In an 
interview she conducted with a member of Hezbollah involved in the 2006 war, it 
becomes apparent that there is a perception within Hezbollah that the war was primarily 
oriented toward defending Lebanon.  Iranian interests did not even surface as an issue in 
the account of the interview.  While this interview was conducted with one individual 
among many in Hezbollah, the rhetoric used suggests that these opinions were 




 A June 2010 report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies also 
suggests that Hezbollah might be less inclined in the future to act in accord with Iranian 
interests, particularly with regards to any confrontation with Israel.  The report argues 
that the political progress made by Hezbollah and the coalition that has been built with 
certain Lebanese Christians could lead the Hezbollah leadership to exercise reluctance 
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While Iranian influence in Lebanon from the 1980s to 2010 may have been 
focused on capitalizing on the shortcomings of the Lebanese government, Iran now finds 
itself able to benefit from not only the shortcomings of the government in Beirut, but also 
the government in Washington.  While it may be debatable how loyal Hezbollah is to 
either Lebanon or Iran, the fact of the matter is that the need for an organization like 
Hezbollah and for foreign investment exists now just as it did two and a half decades ago. 
It would appear that there are significant differences in perceptions between 
Tehran and Hezbollah on the latter‘s strategic role in the broader picture of Middle 
Eastern politics.  To Tehran, Hezbollah is a means through which the Iranian government 
can exercise hegemony in the region.  To Hezbollah, it appears there is a strategic culture 
that has deeper roots in a unique type of Lebanese nationalism than toward loyalty to 
Tehran.  However, regardless of what Hezbollah perceives its own role to be, the inflows 
of weaponry since 2006 (presumably from Iran and Syria), the capital flows from Iran to 
Lebanon and the political connections between Iran and Lebanon, may make it difficult 
in the future for Hezbollah to ignore Tehran.   
Threats to U.S. interests as posed by Iranian and Syrian meddling in Lebanon are 
threefold.  First, the enhancements in Hezbollah‘s weapons capabilities are highly 
disturbing, and run counter to the U.S. interests of degenerating Hezbollah‘s military 
power, ensuring compliance with UNSC Resolutions and protecting Israel.  Second, the 
events of the past year suggest Iran is prepared to provide Lebanon with extensive 
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developmental and military assistance.  Last, the hegemony-through-proxy model 
illustrated by Baer suggests that the empowerment of Hezbollah that has taken place 
since 2006 could spark similar Iranian-proxy relationships throughout the Middle East 
with the end goal of advancing Iranian regional hegemony.   
Ambassador Hill explained the importance of Lebanon to the Iranian government: 
―For them [Iran] a key element of it is to strengthen Shia or to politicize Shia and 
strengthen them wherever possible.  And I think Lebanon is a key element in that strategy 
with Hezbollah.‖
162
  As links between Iran and both Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
government grow in an effort to advance this strategy, it will become increasingly 
difficult for Hezbollah to exercise autonomy as it has in the past.  A recent report citing 
an Israeli allegation that Hezbollah is providing training support to Hamas along with 
Iran
163
 suggests, if true, that Hezbollah may still be viewed in Tehran as an Iranian proxy, 
with costly implications for the United States.  
Major Obstacles to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process 
Syria factors significantly into many of the interests and goals of the United States 
in Lebanon.  These interests include securing the Syrian-Lebanese border to both 
reinforce Lebanese sovereignty and to prevent illegal weapons transfers, preventing 
Syrian support for Hezbollah, making progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict and building 
more substantial relations between the governments in Beirut and Damascus.  The 
advancement of these interests is difficult because the Iranian government continues to 
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exercise power over the government in Syria.  This section will specify several aspects of 
the Syrian-Iranian relationship which could pose a threat to advancing U.S. interests not 
only in Lebanon, but in the broader region. 
 Syria currently finds itself in a unique position due to its complex relationship 
with Iran.  The Iranian state is largely isolated, in a position of ―strategic loneliness.‖
164
  
Perhaps the closest substantial relationship that Iran has is with Syria.  However, as Ray 
Takeyh points out, ―[…] the ties between the two states are at best an alliance of 
convenience based on shared fears and apprehensions.‖
165
  Such common ground 
between Iran and Syria, Takeyh argues, includes the threat posed by Israel.  For both 
countries, Hezbollah plays an essential role as an antagonizing force against Israel.
166
  At 
the same time however, there are points of contention between the two states, particularly 
with regards to how each perceives Hezbollah‘s specific role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
and over what the future shape of Iraqi politics will be.
167
  Given the complexities of this 
relationship, it is entirely possible that Iran can leverage both its common ground with 
Syria as well as its rising political power to influence Syria‘s position on critical U.S. 
interests. 
 One means through which Iran can impact Syrian policy is by influencing the 
situation in Iraq so as to bring about negative political repercussions in Syria.  The role of 
Iran in the post-Saddam, post-American occupation Iraq cannot be overstated.  A recent 
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intelligence report by STRATFOR indicates that in the event that U.S. troops withdraw 
from Iraq by 2012, as they are slated to do, the Iranian government will find it in its 
interest to continue tamper in Iraqi affairs.  This would ensure that Iraq does not pose the 
same threat to Iranian national security as it did under the leadership of former President 
Saddam Hussein.  Iran can influence Gulf developments in many ways, including through 
its ability to, ―[…] covertly support pro-Iranian forces in the region, destabilizing existing 
regimes.‖
168
  Robert Baer points to examples of past instances of such influence, 
particularly Iranian involvement in Iraq‘s key political parties.
169
  It has even been 
suggested that Iranian entities have penetrated the coveted Iraqi oil industry by having 
―looted‖ oil in south Iraq.
170
  In short, Iran is fully capable of exercising power within 
Iraq. 
 While such developments have been taking place in Iraq and do not have a direct 
impact on Lebanon, it is not difficult to see how enhanced Iranian influence in Iraq could 
be used as a tool to pressure Syria to adopt a position in Lebanese relations and the peace 
process that is counter to the interests of the United States.  One powerful tool by which 
Syria is affected is through the Kurdish issue.  The Kurds account for some 8% of the 
population of Syria and Iran could use the Kurds as a political weapon, particularly in 
Iraq.
171
  If Iran were to support Kurdish armed movements,
172
 the consequences could be 
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twofold for Syria.  One, given the proximity of the Kurdish areas in Iraq to Syria, it could 
cause a migration of refugees fleeing the fighting from Iraq to Syria (see Figure 5 in 
Appendix B).  Second, any armed movement in Iraq could conceivably cross Iraq‘s 
borders and affect Syria‘s Kurds.  Both scenarios would create turmoil for the 
government in Damascus. 
 Aside from the Kurdish issue, Iran can also influence Syria through Syrian trade 
ties with Iraq.  Accounting for just over 30% of Syria‘s exports, Iraq is the largest 
importer of Syrian exports.
173
  Iran‘s political connections in Baghdad have already been 
mentioned, and if these pro-Iranian elements were to enjoy enough power, they could 
perhaps seek to employ economic pressure on Syria by imposing trade restrictions against 
Syrian exports to Iraq.  The proposed free trade agreement with Syria,
174
 if approved, will 
certainly help in providing Syria with other lucrative export markets, and in the long-
term, could potentially make Syria‘s exporters less dependent on a country where Iran 
wields economic and political power. 
 More direct economic links between Iran and Syria are also starting to take hold.  
The two countries are anticipated to enter contract on a natural gas pipeline that will 
deliver five million cubic meters a day from Iran to Syria.
175
  A second pipeline linking 
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Iran, Iraq and Syria and capable of accommodating 20 million cubic meters a day should 
be operational in 2015.
176
  These developments show that aside from the issues 
surrounding the Iran-Iraq-Syria nexus, Syria‘s economic dependence on Iran could also 
enhance Iran‘s power in Lebanon by making it more difficult for Syria to insulate 
Lebanon from Iranian influence. 
 The point of highlighting this Iran-Iraq-Syria nexus is to shed light on the 
difficulties Syria faces in deviating from the Iranian course with regards to the Arab-
Israeli conflict and Hezbollah.  These difficulties will likely continue in the future.  The 
stakes are simply too high for Syria politically and economically to turn a cold shoulder 
to Iran.  The implication of this reality for Lebanon is that it can become exceedingly 
difficult for Syria to reach a compromise with Israel so long as Iran seeks to maintain the 
status-quo.  Furthermore, to compound the power that Iran holds over Syria via Iraq, 
there is the fact that while Syria and Iran both play roles in supporting Hezbollah, the 
influence of Iran over Hezbollah has been far greater than Syria‘s since the Lebanese 
civil war.
177
  While Syria may not agree with the non-secular Iranian vision of the 
resistance,
178
 the successes of the resistance while Iran was largely at the helm has made 
it difficult for Syria to change Hezbollah‘s course.
179
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The Threat of the Iranian Nuclear Program 
 While the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran does not pose a direct threat to 
Lebanon or to U.S. interests in that country, an Iranian nuclear arsenal, or even continued 
progress toward obtaining such an arsenal, poses numerous threats to Lebanese stability.  
The Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons is by no means a recent phenomenon, and early 
efforts towards developing the technology necessary for a nuclear weapon date back to 
the time of the Shah.   The 1990s saw a resurrection of this effort with assistance from 
Russia, and by the early 2000s, Iran‘s uranium enrichment capabilities became apparent 
to the United States.
180
 
Preventative Strikes Leading to War 
As the international community determines how to respond to Iran‘s nuclear 
weapons program, one option that is often discussed is the possibility of an Israeli 
airstrike against Iran‘s nuclear infrastructure.  Israel has a precedent of conducting such 
actions, having launched strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria.  It is also 
worth noting that national security was a major factor in Benjamin Netanyahu‘s election 
as Prime Minister.
181
  According to Brent Talbot, the Iranian regime may respond to an 
Israeli attack through the following: ―[w]ith influence over both Hamas and Hizballah, 
Iran would likely use its proxies to launch retribution attacks.‖
182
  Talbot is not alone in 
concluding that Hezbollah can be mobilized in the wake of an Israeli attack against Iran.  
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Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic discusses the possibility of Hezbollah using its weapons 
against Israel following an Israeli attack on Iran,
 183
 thus turning Lebanon into a key 
center of gravity in an Israeli-Iranian conflict. 
Furthermore, if either Israel or the United States strikes Iran‘s nuclear program, 
―[…] an attack could backfire […] and trigger a costly retaliation against the United 
States and U.S. allies in the Middle East.‖
184
  This concern is widespread within the 
academic community and followers of Middle East affairs that U.S. interests in a state 
like Lebanon could become jeopardized should action be taken against Iran‘s nuclear 
program. 
 The risks of an Iranian retaliation are serious, and would pose major risks to U.S. 
interests in Lebanon as Lebanese sovereignty will be threatened in a war with Israel.  
Furthermore, Israel‘s democracy will fail to flourish, and Lebanon‘s Shia will continue to 
militarize and distrust Israel.  Lastly, the U.S. interest of Israeli national security will 
undoubtedly be threatened as Hezbollah strikes Israel.  There are two precedents that 
make the dangers of such a scenario playing out all the more likely.  One is Israel‘s 
willingness to launch airstrikes against potentially threatening weapons programs in the 
region.  A second involves the willingness of Hezbollah to fight Israel, as it did in the 
summer of 2006.  This historical record suggests that should Israel decide that a strike 
against Iran is essential for its own national security, it is highly likely that Lebanon will 
find itself yet again ensconced in war. 
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Nuclear Threats Post-Weaponization 
 As Iran continues work on its nuclear program, it becomes more likely that the 
Islamic Republic will eventually achieve nuclear weapons capabilities.  The longer this 
program lasts, the more likely they will be to make a bomb due to political inertia.  Ray 
Takeyh points out: 
[a]s India and Pakistan demonstrated, once a nuclear program matures, it attracts 
political patrons invoking national prestige, military officers attracted to the 
weapons of awesome power, and a scientific establishment seeking to perpetuate 
a program that generates profits and jobs.
185
   
While it is up for debate whether or not Iran would dare to use a nuclear weapon once 
they have the capability, what is certain is that an Iranian nuclear weapon would 
safeguard Iran‘s involvement in Lebanon by offering an added level of security against 
U.S. or Israeli retaliation.  It could be more assertive and provide more material and 
financial support for Hezbollah, increasing Iranian political hegemony over Lebanon and 
a further proliferation of anti-Israeli sentiment throughout the region.  As Takeyh posits, 
―[a] presumptive nuclear capability would grant Iran a greater ability to assert its interests 
and press it claims.‖
186
   
Takeyh is not alone in reaching this conclusion.  Edelman et al also state that U.S. 
priorities in the Middle East would be jeopardized by an Iranian nuclear armament as Iran 
grows more audacious.
187
  Given the established framework of Iranian involvement in 
Lebanon and the invested Iranian stake in the Hezbollah model as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, it is clear that Iran‘s post-nuclear pursuits would undoubtedly play out in 
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Lebanon.  This effect of politically empowering Iran at the expense of the United States 
will be heightened as Israel and Iran find themselves in the midst of a nuclear arms race.  
Iran will increase its number of nuclear weapons to effectively compete with Israel, and 
as Iran gains more weapons, it will grow bolder in its international endeavors.
188
  
 Another unfortunate consequence that may come about from the nuclear 
weaponization of Iran involves the impact it will have on the ability of the United States 
to advance its interests in the region.  Edleman et al posit that other states in the region 
will perceive the nuclear weaponization of Iran as the result of an inability of the United 
States to exercise power in the region.  They state, ―[i]f the United States cannot prevent 
a conventionally armed Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, its partners in the Middle 
East will almost certainly question its willingness to stand up to a nuclear-armed Iran.‖
189
  
This reality could greatly hinder the ability of the United States to advance its interests in 
Lebanon, particularly regarding multilateral engagements with Israel and Syria, as well as 
interactions with the Lebanese government itself.  As will be elaborated on in Chapter 
Five, the U.S. engagement of Syria and Israel will be key in brokering stability in 
Lebanon.   
With regards to Israel, the United States will need to convince Jerusalem that 
withdrawing from the Shebaa Farms and refraining from future military involvement in 
southern Lebanon is essential to Israeli security.  The United States will also need to 
engage the Syrian government to not only clarify national boundaries as discussed by the 
State Department testimonies before Congress mentioned in Chapter Three, but also by 
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ensuring that the anti-weapons trafficking provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701 are 
enforced in the future.  If the United States cannot succeed in preventing nuclear 
proliferation to what it perceives as a threatening state, governments in Jerusalem and 
Damascus may be less inclined to work with the United States in advancing prerogatives 
in Lebanon; they may very well start to call the U.S. commitment to regional security 
into question. 
Conclusion 
 The influence of Iran in Lebanon has become substantially stronger than that of 
Syria.  In fact, Iran seems to have the power not only to impact developments in Beirut, 
but also in Damascus.   
While Shiite Lebanese Nationalism may be a historically significant phenomenon 
in Lebanese society, the growing links between Iran and Lebanon and the increasing 
power of Iran in the Iran-Syria-Lebanon nexus may make it difficult for Hezbollah to 
exercise autonomy in terms of seeking a less militarized role in Lebanese society.  
American interests of promoting a strong Lebanese government, reinforcing Lebanese 
sovereignty and advancing the Arab-Israeli Peace Process are jeopardized by this new 
reality.  However, the difference in perceptions between Tehran and the Hezbollah 
leadership on the organization‘s role in Lebanon could provide a prime opportunity for 
the United States to influence the situation by helping Lebanon and its government grow 
less dependent on an Iranian regime that does not have Lebanese national interests in 





Chapter Four – Outputs Analysis of U.S. Policy Since 2006 
Introduction 
 The previous two chapters have illuminated the strategic priorities of the United 
States following the 2006 war, the concrete policies that came out of those priorities and 
the impact that Syrian and Iranian policies have had on reinforcing threats to U.S. 
interests.  This chapter will present an outputs analysis of the U.S. policy since 2006 by 
determining the extent of American success in advancing the four objectives delineated in 
Chapter Two.  These objectives are the promotion of democracy, the reinforcement of 
Lebanese sovereignty, the seeking of justice in the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri and advancing Israeli national security. 
Measuring the Success of the Post-2006 Policies 
Promotion of Democracy 
 It is in the policy goal of promoting Lebanese democracy that the United States 
has had perhaps the most success since 2006.  Free presidential elections as supported by 
the United States and the international community did in fact come to fruition.  In the 
spring of 2008, Michel Suleiman was elected by the Lebanese Parliament to be the 




election in Lebanon in the midst of deep political factionalization between the coalit ion 
backed by Hezbollah, and the country‘s more moderate coalition.
190
 
 Further parliamentary elections in 2009 not only were indicative of a trend toward 
democratization, but also reflected some materialization of the belief held by U.S. 
policymakers that by democratizing Lebanon, foreign meddling could perhaps be 
minimized.  The spring 2009 elections resulted in a 71 seat victory for the March 14 
coalition, while the Hezbollah coalition received only 57 seats.
191
  There was also a 
decrease in the number of Hezbollah coalition seats from the 59 it held as of May 2008 
prior to the internationally-brokered Doha Agreement.
192
  The progress made indicates 
the success of the U.S. policy by achieving consistent democratic elections in Lebanon, 
and also in gradually scaling back the power and appeal of Hezbollah, and thus of Syria 
and Iran, in the country‘s political system. 
 More recent events however have shown that Lebanon‘s political system may be 
slipping back from the progress that had been made toward democratization and stable 
leadership.  This political deterioration has come mostly as a result of concerns over the 
results of the United Nations inquiry into the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri – concern voiced particularly by Hezbollah.
193
   When Prime Minister Saad 
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Hariri refused to denounce the investigation, as Hezbollah had sought for him to do, the 
organization withdrew from his government.  Hezbollah then supported the man who will 




 This current crisis has put two U.S. interests at odds: the interest of promoting 
further democratization in Lebanon and the interest of reaching justice in the Hariri 
assassination.  The events of the past few months serve as evidence that both Lebanese 
democracy and justice in the murder are two goals that are not only at odds, but now that 
Hezbollah has an ally as prime minister, may never materialize. 
Reinforcing Sovereignty 
 The United States has achieved limited success toward the goal of promoting 
Lebanese sovereignty in the years following the 2006 conflict.  However, upon looking 
more closely at the sovereignty issue, one can easily see that this goal is still far from 
reality. 
 Perhaps the most noteworthy success of the U.S. objective of promoting Lebanese 
sovereignty can be seen in what Assistant Secretary of State Feltman describes as: 
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[…] the courage that the Lebanese Army demonstrated […] when Sunni terrorists 
from Nahr al-Barid refugee camp threatened Lebanon‘s security, and the 
Lebanese Army took steps.
195
   
Feltman credits the U.S. military assistance program for providing much of the material 
that the LAF required to keep the peace in the camp.
196
  What Feltman fails to 
acknowledge is that the terrorists that the LAF were fighting against in 2007 in the 
refugee camp were from Fatah al-Islam.  This is the same Sunni organization that the 
Bush Administration worked with Saad Hariri and the Saudi Arabian government to 
export to Lebanon in the interest of balancing Hezbollah.  According to one account of 
what transpired, Hariri‘s covert funding of Fatah al-Islam fighters became apparent to 
Hezbollah, prompting Hariri to dispatch the ISF after the fighters.  When the fighters took 
refuge inside the refugee camp, they were confronted by the LAF, which was dispatched 
by President Siniora to respond to the dilemma.  It was whilst outside the camp that the 
LAF was attacked by the Fatah al-Islam fighters, leading to the conflict.
197
 
 Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of this incident was that it became evident that 
two tactics pursued by the United States to achieve the strategic objective of promoting 
sovereignty were at odds.  Supporting Fatah al-Islam and supporting the Lebanese 
military were clearly at odds in this incident, and the result was a military confrontation 
on Lebanese soil. 
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 A more substantial shortcoming of U.S. policy has been the lack of success in 
securing Lebanon‘s borders, and preventing foreign weapons from entering the country.  
Despite the verbiage of the post-war UNSC Resolution, the rhetoric from the State 
Department and the military support offered to the Lebanese government in the interest 
of securing the border, the issue of illegal weapons in Lebanon has become precipitously 
worse.  While some success has been made in preventing weapons transfers, such as the 
fall 2009 Israeli detainment of an alleged weapons shipment en-route from Iran to 
Lebanon,
198
 weapons shipments to Hezbollah continue. 
 In spring 2010, the Israeli government claimed that SCUD missiles had been 
transferred between Syria and Hezbollah.  An analysis from the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies suggests that the SCUDS are likely the SCUD-B variant.  This missile 
has a range of 300 kilometers, and if based in northern Lebanon, could bring even more 
of the country into confrontation with Israel in the event of another war.
199
 
 In addition to the SCUDs, Hezbollah‘s rearmament in the wake of the 2006 war 
has been significant.  Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic reports that the organization has, 
―[…] by most intelligence estimates, as many as 45,000 rockets – at least three times as 
many as it had in the summer of 2006 […].‖
200
  This astonishing level of rearmament 
reflects a failure in the U.S. policy to ensure that weapons do not flow from hostile states 
such as Syria and Iran into Lebanon.   
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Seeking Justice in the Hariri Assassination 
 While the pursuit of justice in the wake of an event such as the assassination of 
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is laudable, the fact of the matter is that this 
investigation, which has been supported by the United States, has had disastrous 
repercussions on the Lebanese democracy and stability.  At the time of this writing, the 
United Nations tribunal investigating the assassination had yet to issue indictments.
201
  
However, the anticipation of the investigation‘s conclusions has already led the 
government under Saad Hariri to end.  Six years after the assassination, the tribunal has 
yet to deliver justice, and it is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.  Moreover, there 
is concern as expressed recently by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that, ―‗[t]he 
absence of a functioning government in Lebanon for several months has created a power 
and security vacuum of which extremist and armed groups could take advantage 
[…].‘‖
202
  Secretary Ban is almost certainly referring to the political chaos that has 
ensued in the wake of Saad Hariri‘s government losing power over the tribunal.   
It can therefore be concluded that while the United States may have had good 
intentions while backing this investigation, the fallout it has created has worked against 
other longer-term U.S. interests in Lebanon.  As of January 2011 when a statement on the 
matter was released by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States still actively 
support the investigation.  Secretary Clinton went so far as to say, ―[t]hose who oppose 
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the Tribunal seek to create a false choice between justice and stability in Lebanon; we 
reject this.‖
203
  While this statement is an impressive showing of the U.S. commitment to 
justice, it reflects ignorance on the part of the Obama Administration to the fact that the 
pursuit of justice has undoubtedly caused a blow to Lebanese democracy. 
Ensuring Israeli National Security 
The reports suggesting a quantitative and qualitative enhancement of Hezbollah‘s 
weapons capabilities reflects a failure on the part of U.S. policy to ensure the protection 
of Israel, as these weapons will conceivably be used against Israel in the event of an 
escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel.
204
  The previous chapter illuminated two 
clear trends with regards to the Israel-Lebanon security environment.  First, while 
Hezbollah has moderated its behavior in some regards by becoming politically active and 
not antagonizing UNIFIL, it still perceives Israel as an enemy that it must arm itself 
against.  The failure of the United States to make progress on reaching at least minimal 
progress in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process is partly to blame.  As will be discussed at 
greater length in the next chapter, the occupation of Lebanon by Israel and future 
concerns about Israeli infringement on Lebanese sovereignty have not been conducive to 
Hezbollah‘s abandoning of militancy. 
Second, while Shia in Lebanon and Hezbollah in particular may perceive 
themselves as being autonomous of Iran, the deepening of Hezbollah-Iranian and 
Lebanese-Iranian relations may detract from the organization‘s autonomy and reinforce 
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their status, as Baer sees is, as an Iranian proxy.  The recent reluctance on the part of the 
United States to provide continued support to the Lebanese government over the past 
year has facilitated Iran‘s continued role as a major financer of security and development 
initiatives in Lebanon. 
A Critique of Broader U.S. Policy Shortcomings 
 An account of the specific measures taken by both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations following the summer of 2006 indicates two trends in post-2006 U.S. 
policy.  First, the policy appears to be grounded in a realist approach to international 
relations, at the expense of other more useful frameworks for dealing with Lebanese 
stability.  Second, there have been noteworthy inconsistencies in pursuing the 
aforementioned policy goals, which have made the advancement of U.S. interests in the 
region difficult. 
A Critique of the Realist Approach 
 The realist paradigm in international relations assumes that states are central 
actors in the international system, stresses the importance of state power, and argues that 
power in itself is a zero-sum phenomenon.
205
  The U.S. approach to Lebanon since 2006 
has, for the most part, operated within this limited paradigm of foreign policy.  The 
central emphasis on maximizing the power of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis 
Hezbollah, Syria and Iran is an example of this.  The current U.S. policy is grounded, 
with some exceptions, in the belief that by arming Lebanon‘s military and by providing 
resources to the government, the appeal of Hezbollah will dissipate, and so too will 
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Syrian and Iranian influence in the country.  The fact of the matter however is that this 
approach has done little to advance the U.S. interests of stabilizing Lebanon and 
marginalizing Hezbollah, Iran and Syria‘s power, as is evidenced by Hezbollah‘s 
advances in military and political power.   
To truly succeed in stabilizing Lebanon, the United States must abandon a purely 
realist approach to Lebanon, and adopt a more constructivist approach to the issue of 
Lebanese stability.  Policymakers must ask themselves why Hezbollah insists on 
remaining armed, why Iran and Syria are able to exploit the political turmoil for their 
own political gain and why many Lebanese are so supportive of Hezbollah and its 
financers.  Chapter Five will shed further light on a more constructivist policy approach 
that can fare better than the current one in promoting Lebanese stability. 
Inconsistencies in U.S. Policy  
 A second general shortcoming of the current U.S. policy involves its 
inconsistencies over the past five years.  One inconsistency involves U.S. assistance 
packages to Lebanon.  While the cornerstone behind the current policy has been that a 
stronger Lebanese government will diminish foreign interference and Hezbollah-
provoked instability, the American commitment to this support has recently been called 
into question.  This inconsistency can be seen in the decreasing levels of U.S. military 
assistance to Lebanon.  Military support appropriations decreased from FY2009 to 
FY2010 from roughly $227,000,000 to $145,500,000.  The FY2011 request is even 
lower, at $132,500,000.
206
   
                                                             




One possible explanation for this is one that has been offered to explain why 
procured military material has taken so long to reach Lebanon.  This explanation claims 
that there is a lack of cohesion in the U.S. foreign policymaking community on how best 
to deal with Lebanon policy.  A report from the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies suggests that the Department of Defense and the Department of State may not be 
in agreement on how to approach Lebanon.  The issue of Israel‘s national security factors 
significantly into the policymaking calculus, leading to some hesitation in providing 
substantial military support to the Lebanese government.
207
 
 Concerns in the U.S. foreign policymaking community over Israeli security 
cannot be overestimated in how it impacts Lebanon policy.  Several events since the 
summer of 2010 have prompted some in the U.S. government to question the prudence of 
providing assistance to the Lebanese government.  In early August 2010, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman expressed concern over Lebanese 
military-Hezbollah relations, resulting in a halt of U.S. assistance.  An event the 
following day which involved the killing of an Israeli military officer by Lebanese forces 
further exacerbated the tension between U.S. policymakers and the Lebanese 
government.
208
  Another unsettling event for the United States occurred in early 2011, 
when Hezbollah‘s increase in political power in the Lebanese government prompted a 
similar response from U.S. policymakers.  A media report citing Obama Administration 
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sources claimed that the United States, ―[…] will probably cut or realign […] aid if 
Hezbollah takes over key ministries under a new prime minister, Najib Mikati […].‖
209
 
 These recent threats made by the U.S. government indicate an American half-
heartedness to back Lebanese democracy.  Despite the clear position the United States 
has claimed in supporting democratic institutions, the U.S. government has been reluctant 
to support an increasing Shia voice in the Lebanese government.  Despite the 
aforementioned statement made by Assistant Secretary Welch in his testimony before the 
House subcommittee that the United States would not frown upon Hezbollah‘s role as a 
political party in Lebanon, the U.S. government is doing just that.  In the first months of 
2011, the United States finds itself without a consensus in Washington on how to 
approach Lebanon.  This has resulted in an inconsistent policy at a time when the Middle 
East is rapidly changing and there is pressure for democratic reform.   
The failure of the post-2006 policy to advance U.S. interests, to take non-realist 
factors into consideration and to be consistent requires a remapping of policy objectives 
in Lebanon for the United States.  The next chapter will highlight recommendations made 
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Chapter Five – A New U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon 
Introduction 
 In the previous two chapters, the shortcomings of the current U.S. policy have 
been illustrated, as have the challenges posed by Iran and Syria to U.S. interests.  This 
chapter will delineate how the United States should respond to the challenge for a new 
policy in Lebanon.   
Containment has been a key theme in U.S. policy toward the Middle East for over 
half a century.  While policy during the Cold War was driven largely by the interest of 
containing the Soviet Union (see Chapter Two), the policies of the past several years 
have reflected an interest in containing Iran.  This must continue to be a core tenet of a 
future policy toward Lebanon.  However, important objectives such as the advancement 
of Lebanese citizens (particularly the Shia) through economic and political development 
and more harmonious relations between Lebanon and its neighbors must also be at the 
center of this new policy. 
 The policy advocated in this chapter requires the United States to address 
Lebanon through three tenets: minimizing Iranian influence in Lebanon, promoting 
economic and political development in the country, and fostering more peaceful relations 
between Lebanon and its neighbors.  These three tenets will serve as the umbrella for a 
new foreign policy, one which will be better suited for safeguarding U.S. interests and 
dealing with the new Iranian and Syrian challenges.  The next three sections will detail 
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each tenet within the framework of military relations, political relations and economic 
development relations.   
Military Relations 
 There is a perception by some in Washington that the Lebanese government is 
hostile to U.S. interests and thus not a suitable candidate for further U.S. assistance.  This 
perception is not only based on a misunderstanding of the complexities of the strategic 
environment, but is one that will further jeopardize U.S. interests.  Since the summer of 
2010, these concerns have lead to a temporary moratorium on assistance.  The saliency of 
this issue continues to the present.  In March 2011, the Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Steve Chabot, called for a termination 
of military assistance to Lebanon in the event that Hezbollah emerges as a member of 
Lebanon‘s government.
210
   
It might be believed by some in Washington that by taking such an approach, the 
United States will be weakening the influence of Hezbollah, and thus Iran, in Lebanon.  
They assume that by pulling the plug on Lebanon‘s government, they will be 
delegitimizing and reducing the power of Hezbollah.
211
  They might also assume that if 
the United States sends a strong signal of disapproval to the Lebanese government, 
perhaps the Lebanese people will in turn look upon Hezbollah with disapproval for 
having ostracized them militarily from the United States. 
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 Any such belief is a misperception of the reality in Lebanon.  As stated in Chapter 
Three, Hezbollah has been able to capitalize in the past on ensuring the protection of 
Lebanon when the country‘s security is called into question.  Moreover, as of late the 
Iranian government itself has shown the willingness to directly provide military 
assistance to Lebanon in the absence of U.S. support.  Hezbollah and Iran have triumphed 
in the past by providing for Lebanon when it was needed most, whether it be through 
funding social programs or offering military aid.  Today, the desire of some policymakers 
in Washington to terminate assistance to the Lebanese military will yield yet another 
opportunity for Hezbollah and Iran.  Furthermore, such a policy would prove 
counterproductive to the U.S. interests of containing Iran and promoting development in 
Lebanon‘s governmental institutions. 
 It is recommended that in the interest of advancing the U.S. goals of containing 
Iran and strengthening the Lebanese government, the United States continue with 
providing high-levels of military assistance to the LAF and ISF.  A third U.S. policy goal 
can also be achieved in continuing to provide support to these forces: the promotion of 
harmonious relations with Lebanon‘s neighbors.  The previous chapter made mention of 
allegations by the Israeli government concerning illegal weapons transfers into Lebanon, 
including the possibility of SCUD missile transfers.   
Given the history of Israeli military operations against Lebanon, it would be 
prudent if the United States sought to take measures to prevent another conflict between 
Israel and Lebanon.  The provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701 seek for, ―[…] the 
Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL […] to deploy their forces together throughout the 
South […]‖ while pointing out, ―[…] the importance of the extension of the control of the 
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Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory […].‖
212
  If the LAF and ISF have 
the material, financing and training to operate in southern Lebanon, it could mitigate 
Israel‘s concerns about another military campaign being necessary to neutralize threats in 
the south of Lebanon.  Ambassador Hill discusses the importance of ―confidence-
building measures‖ in promoting peace between Israel and Lebanon.
213
  By stabilizing 
south Lebanon, the Lebanese military could increase Israeli confidence in the Lebanese 
state in providing for the security of the south, decreasing the probability of another 
military conflict. 
 One crucial military capability in particular that the United States must continue 
to develop is a strong communications infrastructure for the Lebanese military.  A 2011 
report by the Congressional Research Service states that: 
The LAF has only recently acquired limited secure communications capability 
and is attempting to gradually expand this capability to all sectors and levels of 
the LAF.  The LAF currently relies on obsolete systems for radio communications 
between its headquarters and units in the field.  The tactical units of the LAF do 
not have communications systems compatible with other agencies of the 
government and the lack of reliable capability and interoperability with other 
governmental agencies drives most commanders and staff officers to use land line 
or cell phones as their primary means of communication.
214
 
While updating the LAF‘s communications systems has been a priority of U.S. military 
assistance, particularly through expedited support under the National Defense 
Authorization Act Section 1206,
215
 it is essential that the further development of military 
communication infrastructure be supported by the United States.   
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Hezbollah itself had the capabilities to develop a communications system that, it 
is believed, assisted the organization in winning the 2006 conflict.  According to a 2008 
al Jazeera English article quoting the Lebanese Information Minister, ―‗[…] it [the 
Hezbollah communications system] is illegal and constitutes a threat to the government‘s 
sovereignty […].‘‖
216
  In the interests of ensuring political institutional development in 
Lebanon as well as ensuring that the military is capable of protecting Lebanon in 
Hezbollah‘s absence, it is essential that the United States continue to work with the LAF 
through military assistance programs to develop their communications infrastructure. 
 While one may express skepticism about the expectation of the Lebanese military 
being able to become Lebanon‘s only line of defense and to secure the south, recent 
developments within the military suggest that they may be well-suited for the task.  A 
study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests that the legitimacy of 
the organization amongst the Lebanese population is high relative to other national 
entities.  The report states, ―[t]he LAF has shown that it is one of the few Lebanese 
institutions in the post-Syria era trusted by a substantial cross-section of Lebanese 
society.‖
217
  Also significant is the sizable Shia presence within the LAF, accounting for 
nearly ―[…] 30 percent of the officers corps […].‖
218
  Hezbollah thus is not the only 
means through which Shia in Lebanon can contribute to the national security of the 
country. 
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 Another misperception that appears to exist in Washington is that military 
assistance in itself could serve as a means to ensure that weapons are not illegally 
transferred into Lebanon.  The 2011 CRS report aforementioned states that: 
[t]he Obama Administration and some members of the 111
th
 Congress have 
supported the continuation of this [military assistance] program.  They hope that 
continued support will help secure Lebanon‘s borders against smuggling and, in 
particular, against the flow of weapons to Hezbollah and other non-state actors.
219
   
However, it would appear that military support is not sufficient to actually stop such 
flows.  This fact is proved by the report that Hezbollah has far more weapons than it did 
prior to the spike in U.S. military support.  Additionally, according to the U.N. Secretary 
General‘s 2010 report on UNSC Resolution 1701, the Lebanese government ―[…] did not 
report any breach of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1701 (2006).‖
220
  This 
suggests that the Lebanese government may either be turning a blind eye to these 
weapons transfers, or may actually be helping to facilitate them.  Therefore, the solution 
to the problem involves not addressing the issue of weapons transfers, but rather the issue 
of why Hezbollah seeks weapons. 
 It is essential that policymakers in Washington begin to look at the broader 
picture in the context that has allowed for Hezbollah‘s existence as a militia.  Paul Salem 
sheds light on one such factor, positing that the lack of power on the part of Lebanon‘s 
government, including the military, has been a driving-force for the organization.
221
  A 
second significant factor is the organization‘s role as a very successful force in the 
                                                             
219 Addis January 19, 2011, 1. 
 
220 United Nations Secretary-General 1 November 2010, 10. 
 
221 Salem 2006. 
82 
 
opposition against Israel.  This role is much the product of support from Syria and Iran.  
As Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson conclude, ―[…] absent a larger Israel-Syria 
peace accord, outright disarmament of Hezbollah – i.e., the destruction or custodial 
transfer of weapons – is infeasible.‖
222
  It is not only a peace agreement between Syria 
and Israel that would be necessary for disarmament.  Paul Salem posits that the 




 Given this reality, two broad political goals must be advanced by the United 
States.  First, the Lebanese government must facilitate the advancement of Shia in 
Lebanon.  Second, an Arab-Israeli peace agreement must be pursued, which will make 
Hezbollah‘s militia unnecessary. 
Bringing Lebanese Shia into the Political Process 
There is significant evidence to support the argument that Hezbollah can be de-
militarized and brought into the political process in Lebanon as a peaceful player.  A 
2008 book by the RAND Corporation entitled How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for 
Countering al Qa’ida presents research findings on 648 terrorist organizations over forty 
years, and concludes, ―[…] that a transition to the political process is the most common 
way in which terrorist groups ended (43 percent).‖
224
  Furthermore, Hezbollah is 
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classified in the study as an organization geared toward ―regime change.‖
225
  One of the 
conclusions reached in the study was that in the case of organizations with, ―[…] minimal 
goals, such as policy change, governments may be able to reach a negotiated settlement 
with the group.‖
226
   
While changing a government is not nearly as simple as changing policies, it is 
quite possible that a change in the composition of Lebanon‘s government can be 
sufficient in the eyes of Hezbollah to achieve their goals.  Perhaps as Hezbollah plays a 
larger role in the governance of Lebanon, and is able to impact changes in policy and 
play a component in the regime, their militant existence will become superfluous.  In the 
context of politics, it is important to note that Hassan Nasrallah as well as others within 
Hezbollah have made clear that they do not support turning Lebanon into an Islamic 
country, and do not seek to change the Lebanese ―multicultural society.‖
227
  Therefore, 
despite RAND‘s categorization of Hezbollah as an organization looking to change the 
government of Lebanon, they appear to be more concerned with enhancing power within 
the current government.   
If the Lebanese government enhances its ability to provide security and social 
services to Shia, there is no reason to believe that Hezbollah cannot de-militarize.  
Therefore, the United States should seek to reinforce Lebanese sovereignty, develop their 
military and enhance the quality of life of Lebanese Shia to help facilitate this transition 
from a militarized movement. 
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 If Hezbollah is to be demilitarized in the long-term, the United States must work 
with the Lebanese government to address the reasons discussed in Chapter Three that fuel 
Hezbollah‘s existence.  As was mentioned, one of the two major reasons for its existence 
is the national security of Lebanon.  Beginning in the 1980s, through the 1990s and in 
2006, Hezbollah has been the region‘s only entity capable of waging a war against Israel.  
If Hezbollah is to disarm and continue to move toward existing purely as a political 
entity, the need for a strong non-governmental defense against Israel must be eliminated.  
While arming the Lebanese government to promote Israeli confidence as discussed 
earlier is one step toward this goal, a more substantial step must involve ending the 
occupation. 
 If the Israeli threat to the Arab World is neutralized through a peace agreement, 
Hezbollah will be forced to find a new principal objective to work towards and to build 
appeal on – an objective that will likely take the form of the advancement of Shia in the 
political realm.  Without disarming and without an enemy, Hezbollah would risk 
ostracizing itself from the Lebanese population and consequently from Lebanese politics. 
It appears that Hezbollah is principally concerned with its goal of championing the 
resistance movement against Israel.
228
  After all, resistance is the concept that the 
organization was established on in the 1980s.  However, as Simon and Stevenson posit, a 
shift may be underway to focus more on the political realm.
229
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Lacking a nationalist connection to Iran and without a vision for an Islamic 
Lebanon, resistance to Israel remains the only significant theme other than a common 
religion linking Hezbollah to Iran.  Once the Israeli occupation has totally ended, and 
once it is clear that Israel and Lebanon are on a track toward rapprochement, Hezbollah 
will have to decisively shift its primary goal from militancy to political involvement if it 
is going to survive. 
The Implementation of an Arab-Israeli Peace Agreement 
 The argument that a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli process is necessary 
for the disarmament of Hezbollah is not one made solely by this author; Numerous 
experts on Lebanon have shed light on this reality.  Paul Salem argues that: 
[i]f Resolution 1701 is successfully implemented - - if the army can secure the 
south, there are no future Israeli attacks, Shebaa Farms is handed over to UN 
control, and all captives are returned -- the task of persuading Hezbollah to disarm 
will be easier, since its raison d‘etre as a militia will be compromised.
230
   
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson also make similar claims.  While stopping short of 
advocating for an Arab-Israeli resolution as a means to disarm Hezbollah, they 
acknowledge the importance and impact of an agreement.  They write: 
[o]ne lesson here [the allegations of Syrian SCUD missiles being transferred to 
Hezbollah] is that absent a larger Israel-Syria peace accord, outright disarmament 
of Hezbollah – i.e., the destruction or custodial transfer of weapons – is 
infeasible.
231
   
 
Cathy Sultan also references Hezbollah‘s commitment to Lebanese security in this 
regard, stating, ―Hezbollah, certain the territory [the Shebaa Farms] belonged to Lebanon, 
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 It is recommended that the U.S. government accept the theory that disarming 
Hezbollah is incumbent upon fostering peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, most 
importantly Syria and Lebanon.  This theory should become the underlying assumption 
behind the U.S. approach to Lebanon and its security regarding Hezbollah.  This policy 
framework could also yield dividends in terms of providing guidance in addressing other 
threats such as Hamas. 
 One important first step the United States can take in the direction of chipping 
away at the Arab-Israeli conflict would be to work toward the implementation of the 
Seven Point Plan presented in 2006.
233
  Among the provisions of the plan is that the 
international community work: 
[…] to place the Shebaa Farms area and the Kfarshouba Hills under UN 
jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully 
settled.  While in UN custody, the area will be accessible to Lebanese property 
owners there.  Further, Israel surrenders all remaining landmine maps in South 
Lebanon to the UN.
234
   
 
The idea of ending the occupation of the Shebaa Farms to help facilitate Hezbollah‘s 
giving up its weapons is also proposed by Simon and Stevenson.
235
  Other provisions of 
the plan include the United Nations taking steps to foster more peaceful relations between 
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Lebanon and Israel.  These provisions will also be consistent with the aforementioned 
defense assistance plan of providing the Lebanese military the means to stabilize the 
south of the country.
236
 
In addition to providing the United Nations with landmine maps, the United 
States should also work with the Israeli government to provide maps indicating the 
locations where cluster bombs were dropped in southern Lebanon.  As of 2008, the 
agricultural areas in the south were plagued by the presence of unexploded cluster bombs.  
According to Cathy Sultan, ―The United Nations estimates that thirty percent of South 
Lebanon‘s cultivatable land was affected by cluster bombs. […]  An estimated ninety 
percent of the local population depends on agriculture.‖
237
  As of 2008, the United 
Nations had not been provided with the locations of these bombs, despite the request of 
Human Rights Watch.
238
     
A brief aside on U.S. policy toward Israel is necessary.  The Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks attempted by President Obama were met with half-heartedness by the 
Netanyahu Administration in Jerusalem.  Prime Minister Netanyahu‘s government was 
reluctant to compromise on an issue viewed by the Palestinians, the United States and the 
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 Given the failure of these talks at the hands of the Israeli government, the Obama 
Administration is left in a position of leverage to re-launch talks in a direction seen as 
appropriate by the United States.  Without threatening Israel yet without remaining 
passive to the situation, the United States is in a position to hinge U.S. military assistance 
to Israel on an Israeli commitment to the Seven Point Plan.  This can be done in such a 
way that the potential reduction in aid levels would not jeopardize Israeli national 
security, but would show that the United States is serious about resolving the Israeli 
dispute with Lebanon immediately.  This plan must be packaged to Israel in such a way 
that it is abundantly clear that resolving the Shebaa Farms issue is a necessary first-step 
in the disarmament of Hezbollah, and thus in the national security interests of Israel.  
This would involve addressing the geostrategic value that the Israeli government has 
placed on the Shebaa Farms broadly and southern Lebanon in general, outside of the 
realm of the Hezbollah threat. 
 One key Israeli interest in the south of Lebanon pertains to water security, and the 
Israeli government‘s efforts to provide water for its population.  Water security is a 
tremendous issue in Israel; it is believed that an inability to secure access to usable water 
was an impetus behind the Israeli settler disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005.
240
  
Israel is struggling to secure access to water, and southern Lebanon has proven to be a 
prime source of it for the Israelis.  The Litani River in Lebanon is perceived by Israel to 
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be an important future source of water, especially given its low salt levels.
241
  The Shebaa 
Farms and Hashbani River are other potential sources of water for Israel, and the Israelis 
have been able to exploit these resources.  According to Cathy Sultan, the Director-
General of the Litani River Authority has suggested that the Israeli penetration of these 
water resources has cost Lebanon ―over $2 billion.‖
242
  Sultan argues that while the Litani 
River cannot serve as a source of water for both countries simultaneously, the water in 
the Shebaa Farms area potentially can if a deal between Israel and Lebanon was to be 
reached.
243
  She also acknowledges the fact that, ―[…] Israel‘s withdrawal from the 
Shebaa Farms would strengthen the Siniora government because it could then 
legitimately call on Hezbollah to disarm.‖
244
 
 Negotiations over the return of the Shebaa Farms could and should include a 
discussion on the sharing of the water resources in the area.  Israel can benefit from 
working toward the disarmament of Hezbollah and securing access to Lebanese water 
through a legally-binding international agreement.  This can serve as an important first 
step toward a broader Arab-Israeli agreement.  But by resolving a major 
Israeli/Lebanese/Syrian dispute over an easily solvable issue in the near-term, the United 
States can gradually obviate the need for a Shia militia within Lebanon while also 
chipping away at the anti-Israeli links between Syria and Hezbollah on the one hand, and 
Iran on the other. 
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 The recent discovery of natural gas in the Mediterranean off the coast of Israel 
underscores the need for progress to be made for a peace agreement between Israel and 
Lebanon.   The field found in 2009 in Israeli waters was the world‘s biggest at the time.  
Oil has also been found in the area.  The absence of a formal maritime border between 
Israel and Lebanon complicates the situation.  According to a Christian Science Monitor 
report, ―[i]n the absence of a mutual agreement on the border and division of resources, 
Israel could follow the ‗right of capture‘ rule, which allows a nation to extract oil or gas 
from its side of the border, even if the reserves stretch into another country‘s territory.‖
245
  
The situation is further strained by Lebanon‘s debt and the possibility of natural resource 
revenues.  It is also complicated by Hezbollah‘s defiance to turn to violence against Israel 
if Lebanese oil and gas resources are exploited by Jerusalem.
246
 
 A formal maritime border must be an important component of any initial 
agreement between Israel and Lebanon.   Without it, Hezbollah can argue that its arms 
are needed to protect Lebanon‘s energy interests, and it will become increasingly difficult 
to get the organization to disarm.  Again, the Israeli government must be convinced by 
the United States that it is in their long-term security interests to formalize the border and 
to respect it when it comes to resource extraction. 
Economic Development Relations 
 The United States can greatly enhance the prospects for Lebanese stability and the 
protection of U.S. interests through improving its economic development assistance to 
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Lebanon.  A strong assistance program can have multiple positive effects on U.S. security 
interests.  Development can help advance democratization as well as create an 
environment that is less conducive to the kinds of radicalization sought by Hezbollah.  
Several works have studied the impact of economic development on democratization.  
One prominent piece is by Martin Lipset, in which he argues: 
Increased wealth is not only related causally to the development of democracy by 
changing the social conditions of the workers, but it also affects the political role 
of the middle class through changing the shape of the stratification structure so 
that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a 
diamond with a growing middle-class.  A large middle class plays a mitigating 
role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic 
parties and penalize extremist groups.
247
 
A more contemporary work that sheds light on the nexus of economics, democracy and 
terrorism is offered by Eva Bellin, who explores the relationship between development 
on the one hand, and the proliferation of democracy and prevention of radicalization on 
the other.  She states: 
Although the cause of Islamic radicalism cannot be reduced to simple economics, 
it seems plausible to argue that the pervasive unemployment, stagnating living 
standards, and general hopelessness found in much of the MENA [Middle East 
and North Africa] region help to fuel its spread.  Attacking these problems 
through economic growth would likely diminish the mass appeal of radical 
Islamists, unplug key motivations for violence and terror, and foster the political 
moderation that is essential to viable democracy.
248
 
Keeping in mind this important role of development in achieving U.S. strategic interests, 
there are several policy recommendations that can be made.   
Last, a strong U.S. development program could also help to improve the 
perception of the United States amongst the Lebanese general populace.  Ambassador 
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Hill posits that the perception of the United States in Lebanon could improve by creating 




Broader Financial Support for Development from the United States 
First, by working with the Lebanese government to facilitate the development of 
the economy, particularly in Shia parts of the country, the Lebanese government can 
increase its power relative to Hezbollah.  If financial capital from the United States 
helped support the development of Lebanon, particularly the south, the need for 
Hezbollah‘s services and aid from Iran will become unnecessary.  In this time of onerous 
federal budget deficits, the funding for this support does not necessarily have to come 
from the purse of the U.S. government.  The U.S. Department of State has an opportunity 
to build on the support of the numerous Lebanese political organizations that exist within 
the United States to pool resources that could be used toward development initiatives.   
As Kail Ellis points out, there are at least half a dozen politically-oriented entities 
in the United States which broadly seek to advance Lebanese independence.
250
  One 
organization not mentioned by Ellis but significant nonetheless is the Aspen Institute, the 
participation of which could be greatly beneficial to a State Department-led development 
initiative, particularly given the work of its U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program.  According 
to the dialogue‘s website: 
[t]he U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program encourages productive U.S.-Lebanon 
relations, promotes discussion on Lebanon in Washington, and supports initiatives 
                                                             
249 Hill 2010. 
 




that strengthen Lebanese independence and sovereignty. […] [T]he Program also 
supports initiatives that advance Lebanese political reform, economic 
development, and social progress.
251
   
The institute is involved in a regional development financing program similar to the one 
advocated in this thesis.  The Aspen Institute‘s Middle East Investment Initiative is ―[…] 
a public-private partnership of the Aspen Institute, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, and the Palestinian Investment Fund.‖
252
  This partnership provides 
financing in the form of ―[…] a $228 million loan guarantee program for small and 
medium-sized businesses in the Palestinian Territories.‖
253
  The goal of this development 




 In addition to the development initiatives already underway by the United States 
in Lebanon, the State Department can work closely with these organizations in 
developing a fund that can aid new initiatives.  The State Department is no stranger to 
spearheading such funds in the Middle East.  One initiative that promoted 
democratization in the region was the Middle East Democracy Fund, which used grants 
to help support democratic initiatives through USAID.
255
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 The strength of the organizational capabilities of the Department of State, the 
presence of organizations such as the Aspen Institute, the robust Lebanese civil society in 
the United States and the large U.S. donor base creates an environment conducive to 
launching such a development initiative.  The State Department can work closely with the 
Lebanese government to identify specific communities and initiatives that could create 
jobs and enhance the quality of life for those in poorer areas in Lebanon.  As the 
aforementioned divide between Lebanese nationalism and Iran‘s agenda of using 
Hezbollah to advance its own interests becomes greater and tenser, capital flows from the 
United States in support of development initiatives could ensure that Iran does not 
capitalize on a lack of Western assistance to Lebanon. 
 To strengthen the developmental and security potential of this program, it is 
recommended that two conditions be placed on this assistance.  First, it should be 
required that the Lebanese government make a larger commitment toward privatizing 
major industries.  Lebanon has been plagued by an economic and legal environment in 
which doing business, particularly securing investment, has been difficult.
256
  The 
Lebanese government however has already taken major steps to combat the difficulties 
associated with starting new businesses in the country.  Data from Figure 1 (figures 
located in appendix A) indicates that from 2007 to 2010, the government cut the number 
of days needed to launch a business from 46 to only nine.  This time period ranks well 
relative to nearby Israel, Syria and Jordan, where time periods for 2010 were 34, 13 and 
13 days, respectively.  As Figure 2 shows, the number of steps necessary to launch a 
business in 2010 was lower in Lebanon than in Syria, Jordan or Turkey.  Lebanon is tied 
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with Israel in this category, and has seen a slight decline in the number of steps since 
2007.   
While launching a business has become easier in Lebanon, it is more difficult to 
sustain business operations in the country.  In Figure 3, data from the World Bank Ease 
of Doing Business Index shows that government policies in Lebanon make it more 
difficult to do business there relative to Israel, Jordan and Turkey (far more difficult in 
the cases of Israel and Turkey).  U.S. assistance through the proposed support fund 
should be incumbent upon the Lebanese government taking steps to improve its position 
on the Ease of Doing Business Index by altering policies that may hinder the ability of 
firms to conduct business. 
 A second condition of this assistance should be requirements for the Lebanese 
government to take larger steps toward privatizing critical industries.  The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has shed light on the importance of privatization in Lebanon in a 
2010 report.  The IMF states that privatization, particularly in the telecommunications 
and commercial aviation industries, could have several beneficial effects on the broader 
economy.  With regards to the former, they posit that, ―[t]elecom privatization could 
enhance the economy‘s growth potential while helping to reduce the public debt.‖
257
  In 
terms of aviation, the report states that privatizing the Lebanese airline MEA could be to 
the financial benefit of the central bank.
258
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 Privatization can serve not only to increase efficiencies in the delivery of essential 
services, but it could also save the Lebanese government money in the process.  By 
reducing the government‘s financial obligations to telecommunications and aviation, the 
government will be in a better position to invest capital and other resources in 
development initiatives.  One strategy that could perhaps be pushed by the United States 
in promoting privatization in Lebanon could be the use of Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs).  The aforementioned IMF report discusses how these partnerships could be used 
as a middle-ground initiative between the private sector providing services and the 
government administration of services.  Such a strategy could yield positive effects such 
as, ―[…] the potential for higher quality services at lower costs.‖
259
  Lebanon‘s 
government is working toward PPP programs according to the IMF,
260
 but the United 
States can strive to make sure that such programs are eventually executed. 
 By promoting the growth of the private sector, fostering job growth, expanding 
access to important services and developing critical areas of the Lebanese economy, the 
United States can help ensure that a social environment emerges in Lebanon that is not 
conducive to the kinds of inequality that Hezbollah has taken advantage of in the past.  
There is also reason to believe that the political uncertainty that currently exists in 
Lebanon could be an impetus to a restructuring of the Lebanese economy.  Eva Bellin 
posits, ―[…] that a dual context of crisis and hope constitutes the best condition for 
reform readiness.‖
261
  Given this, the time would seem ripe for a firm U.S. commitment 
                                                             
259 International Monetary Fund n.d., 16. 
 




to helping the Lebanese government in restructuring and developing the Lebanese 
economy. 
Trade and Security 
The positive effects of economic development on advancing democratization and 
promoting a more peaceful Lebanese society can also be realized by building trade 
relations between Lebanon and the rest of the world, particularly with its immediate 
neighbors.  These agreements, namely any one including Syria or Israel, should include 
provisions that would help ensure that international law be upheld by all parties, so as to 
link economic prosperity with security.  In the realm of trade, the United States currently 
has opportunities to engage the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the small regional 
bloc that has come together to form a local free trade area. 
The impact that trade can have on international relations and security is explored 
by Dale Copeland.  Copeland‘s theory is that economic interdependence through trade is 
not sufficient to prevent states from fighting.  The essential component to 
interdependence yielding peaceful ends is the anticipation in the countries trading that 
trade volume will remain strong.
262
  By promoting free trade relations between Lebanon, 
Syria and possibly Israel in the long-term, the United States can foster an economic 
interdependence that makes the incidence of war or conflict between them unlikely. 
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With regards to WTO membership, the Lebanese government has been working 
for 12 years to become a member of the body.  While a ―Working Party‖ was created 
twelve years ago, the WTO website suggests that there have been no developments 
regarding Lebanon‘s membership process since the party met in the fall of 2009.
 263
  The 
State Department currently looks favorably upon Lebanese membership to the WTO,
264
 
but steps should be taken so that this goal is followed through with in the near-term and 
not abandoned as members of Congress have already threatened to abandon support to 
Lebanon. 
The impact that promoting trade liberalization in the Middle East can have on the 
relations of the region is highlighted by trade expert Mike Pullen in a June 2009 al 
Jazeera article.  Pullen proposes that the model of ―economic development and regional 
integration‖ that prevailed in Europe following World War II could also be the key to 
more harmonious relations in the Middle East.
265
  By pursuing the development support 
initiatives mentioned earlier in this chapter, namely privatization, the United States can 
ensure that Lebanon is coming closer to meeting the requirements of becoming a member 
of the WTO.  According to Chapter Five of the Handbook on Accession to the WTO, 
privatization of industry is a process that factors quite significantly into the membership 
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  Therefore, the conditions to the previously mentioned development 
financing program would go hand-in-hand in helping to also achieve Lebanese 
membership to the WTO. 
Aside from the WTO negotiations, Lebanon will soon be party to a free trade 
agreement with Turkey, Syria and Jordan.
267
  While it is unclear how much progress has 
been made on the agreements with Jordan and Syria, Lebanon entered its agreement with 
Turkey in November 2010.
268
  The progress being made toward a free trade agreement 
between Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan provides a prime opportunity for the United 
States to advance its interests of developing the Lebanese economy, fostering normalized 
Lebanese-Syrian relations and encouraging the proliferation of free trade.  There is also 
an opportunity for the United States to engage Lebanon, Turkey, Syria and Jordan to 
assure that trade taking place under this agreement is in conformance with UNSC 
Resolution 1701.   
The United States can engage the governments of those involved in the 
agreement(s) to have UNSC Resolution 1701 compliance measures incorporated into the 
agreement.  For example, if weapons shipments were found to be taking place between 
Syria and Lebanon, the matter could immediately be taken up by the WTO, and 
protectionist measures can be taken by the Lebanese government against Syria.  The 
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current trade relationship between Syria and Lebanon is substantial.  Lebanon is Syria‘s 
second-largest export market – a destination for over 12% of Syria‘s exports.
269
  By 
giving the Lebanese government the power to impose import restrictions, tariffs or quotas 
against Syrian imports in the event that violations of Resolution 1701 are discovered, the 
Syrian government may be deterred from allowing illegal weapons transactions to 
Hezbollah. 
The United States should work to engage the Lebanese government and the 
governments of European states with close relations to Lebanon to push for trade 
liberalization and Lebanese inclusion in trade schemes.  A long-term trade liberalization 
goal of the United States can be to eventually establish a trade agreement between 
Lebanon and Israel. 
Conclusion 
 The political, military and economic policies prescribed in this chapter have been 
offered in response to a thorough analysis of the shortcomings of the current U.S. policy 
and the threats that the United States will continue to face in Lebanon in the future.  
While the current policy is plagued by contradictions, special care has been given to 
make recommendations that are not only compatible with one another, but also 
complement each other.  Consistent themes of multilateralism, economic liberalism, and 
consolidating Lebanese state military power are present throughout. 
 Implementing these recommendations would not involve a significant deviation 
from the course of the current U.S. policy.  Rhetorically, the United States has expressed 
its support for promoting democracy in Lebanon, increasing Lebanese military power, 
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developing the economy and facilitating a peace agreement.  These recommendations are 
























Chapter Six – Conclusions and Final Thoughts 
 Wilsonianism has been at play in U.S. relations with Lebanon since the era of the 
missionaries.  In the 19
th
 century, these relations were about the proliferation of religious 
ideals.  Today, relations are focused on the spreading of democratic principles.  
Containment, first of the Soviet Union and now of Iran, has also loomed large in this 
policy.  However, the record since 2006 shows that the current U.S. policy suffers from 
shortcomings and contradictions.  While limited progress has been made in promoting 
democratization, all other policy goals have experienced shortcomings.  This reality 
merits a reevaluation of the policy. 
The Costs of Maintaining the Status-Quo  
The worldview that democracies are the ideal system of government has been 
embraced in the Wilsonian paradigm of foreign policy making in the United States.  Its 
evidence can be seen in fostering the birth of democratic governments after World War 
II, maintaining close relations with the Western European democratic states during the 
Cold War,
270
 and in promoting democratization in the Middle East under the 
neoconservative tenets of the George W. Bush Administration.
271
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Promoting democratization is certainly not a troublesome policy if it is exercised 
consistently.  The central problem that this thesis has identified is that the current policy 
toward supporting Lebanese democracy has been inconsistent.  While the United States 
has offered support to reinforce Lebanon‘s democratic institutions in the past, there is 
currently the possibility that this support could be terminated, as has been threatened, if 
Hezbollah continues to play a role in the government.  By making such demands, 
policymakers in the United States are placing a condition on the Lebanese democracy – 
an expectation that it will conform to an American vision of what that democracy should 
look like.  Furthermore, a significant portion of the Lebanese population would be 
ostracized politically if Hezbollah were to be kept out of government, thus detracting 
from the government‘s democratic character. 
A second risk of maintaining the status-quo relates to Iran‘s power.  Many of the 
threats that exist to the United States and its interests in the Middle East emanate from 
Iran.  Concerns exist of how this government could use its potential future nuclear arsenal 
toward a number of ends, including jeopardizing oil flows and maritime traffic in the 
Strait of Hormuz and inflicting violence on Israel through Hamas or Hezbollah.
272
  
However, the American response to these threats has yielded a self-fulfilling prophecy 
that has resulted in the United States being unable to make progress on the relationship 
with Iran and in advancing ―interests in common‖ with Iran.
273
  So long as tensions 
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remain between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, it will almost 
assuredly have implications in Lebanon as Iran continues to project its power in Lebanon 
and against Israel through Hezbollah. 
If relations between the United States and Iran are to remain tense, then the 
United States must ensure that Lebanese militancy is eliminated as a policy option for the 
Iranian leadership.  A more prudent policy goal of the United States would be to seek a 
rapprochement with the Islamic state.
274
  It is well acknowledged though by this author 
that many of the policies of the Iranian government may make rapprochement politically 
infeasible at the moment.  Therefore, eliminating Hezbollah‘s militia is the only sure way 
to ensure that these tensions do not have implications on U.S. interests in Lebanon and 
Israel.  The current policy toward Lebanon has proven incapable of containing Iran thus 
far.  Thus, the recommendations of Chapter Five should be explored by policymakers. 
The Challenges for the United States 
 The coming months will certainly be challenging for U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East as policymakers react to regional trends toward governmental change.  In 
this context, the United States is being forced to adapt to the reality of having to support 
democratization in the Middle East, even if that does not necessarily translate into a pro-
American or pro-Western regime.  U.S. policymakers must realize that democracy will 
not always yield a regime that shares the same perspective and interests as Washington.  
Specifically, members of the administration and the Congress must accept that 
Hezbollah‘s involvement in the Lebanese government is a part of that country‘s 
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democracy, and that taking measures against the country as a result of that would be 
counterproductive to U.S. interests. 
 The recent developments in Syria may very well complicate U.S. efforts to 
facilitate some of the peace-building measures advocated in this paper in the immediate 
short-term.  However, that does not mean that the United States is incapable at the 
moment of capitalizing on the situation to protect its interests in Lebanon.  Simon and 
Stevenson highlight one current trend: 
 [w]hatever Assad‘s current disposition, Syria remains regionally weaker, and that 
fact may well have changed the Hezbollah leadership‘s calculations about 
Hezbollah‘s political legitimacy versus the retention of arms and posture of anti-
Israeli resistance.  […] Given it‘s now-established political legitimacy in Lebanon 
and Syria‘s attenuated influence there, Hezbollah has sufficient political freedom 
to embark on a slow path to disarmament.
275
   
It would be a wasted opportunity if the United States continues to try to impede 




 Lebanon is unique in that it is one of the few governments in the Middle East to 
be built on democratic principles.  The United States has made efforts, particularly since 
2006, to sustain that democracy.  However, unless the quality of life is increased in 
Lebanon – particularly for the Shia – unless all the people of Lebanon have a fair voice in 
the country‘s government and unless the security situation concerning foreign 
involvement and the relationship with Israel improves, popular unrest could yet again 
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become a reality.  Such unrest is not new to Lebanon, and has been seen in the streets of 
many Arab capitals in recent months.  Hezbollah would almost certainly capitalize off 
such disenchantment, as they have in the past, and maximize their power-base.  With an 
inconsistent and contradictory Lebanon policy and an immobile peace process, the United 
States is ill-equipped at the present to prevent such an outcome.  The United States 
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Appendix A - Figures 
Data from all graphs obtained from the online database of the World Bank.  All graphs 
were created by the author.  The numerical data for Figures 1-3 can be found in Figure 4. 
 
From: The World Bank, Data | The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed 
April 23, 2011).  According to The World Bank: ―Time required to start a business is the 
number of calendar days needed to complete the procedures to legally operate a business.  
If a procedure can be speeded up at additional cost, the fastest procedure, independent of 
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From: The World Bank, n.d.  According to The World Bank: ―Start-up procedures are 
those required to start a business, including interactions to obtain necessary permits and 
licenses and to complete all inscriptions, verifications, and notifications to start 
operations.  Data are for businesses with specific characteristics of ownership, size, and 
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From: The World Bank, n.d.  According to The World Bank: ―Ease of doing business 
index ranks economies from 1 to 183, with first place being the best.  A high ranking 
means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business operation.  The index 
ranks the simple average of the country‘s percentile rankings on 10 topics covered in the 
World Bank‘s Doing Business.  The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the 
percentile rankings on its component indicators.‖ 
 
Figure 4 - Data from The World Bank Used in Figures 1-3 
  "Time required to start a business (days)" 
    
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Lebanon 46 46 46 46 46 11 9 9 
Israel 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Syria 43 43 43 43 43 16 15 13 
Jordan 79 26 16 16 14 14 13 13 
Turkey 38 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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"Start-up procedures to register a business (number)" 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Lebanon 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 
Israel 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Syria 12 12 12 12 13 8 7 7 
Jordan 13 10 10 10 9 9 8 8 
Turkey 13 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 




      Lebanon 109 113 
      Israel 30 29 
      Syria 144 144 
      Jordan 107 111 
      Turkey 60 65 
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Appendix B - Maps 
Figure 5 - Kurdish Areas in Iraq and Their Proximity to Syria 
 
From: Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, "Kurdish Region Under Increasing Threat, 
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (May 16, 2007), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076522.html  (accessed April 30, 2011) 
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Figure 6 - Map of Lebanon 
 
From: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook [Lebanon],  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html (accessed April 
30, 2011) 
